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MAS?J!ER OF AR'l'S 
II 
lftS?O.RY 
UNIVEBSIT~ F lHOP~ lSLAIDl 
19.59 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of .American policy !n the 
conflict between China and Japan in 1931 and 1932~ The dis -
pute 1· _ of tremendous significance since it was what has 
often been called the first step leading to World Var II . 
The purpose here is to meke a thorough study of the develop-
ment of American pol icy in the Manchurian affair nd the 
events that o¢cured 1n Shanghai early in 19.32 and to draw 
some conclusion as to why American poliey ·did not succeed . 
The major source of primary research material was 
five volumes of The Foreign Relati ons of tbe United States , 
a comprehensive a-ccumulation of diplomstie papers publish _ed 
by the State Department from 1943 to 1949. Also, consider-
able a.ttenti on was given to The Far Eastern Crisis, the 
journal of the man most responsible for the policy of the 
United States, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson . The 
Report of the Assembl y of the League of Nations• the body 
which passed final judgment age1nst Japan, the State Depart-
ment publication . Pea ce and War, and the Report of the League 
of Nations Commission of Enquiry were also utilized . 
Them Jor secondary source consulted was .TI!!_ 
Manchurian er:,. is, 'by Sara R .. Smith, a work published in 
1948. The chief source of information regarding develop-
ments within Japan wee War and Diplomacy in the Japanese 
(111) 
(iv) 
Empire, by Ts.tsuji Takeuchi . 
The main finding of this study is that American 
poli"cy was gu·ilty of two major errors. Fir t; the _ United 
States stayed out of the dispute publ1e1y for the fir -st two 
months. The put'poee of this move was to avoid fanning the 
flames of nat1onal1am in 3apan and give the c1v-111an element 
in the government a en nee to wrest control away from the 
military. The result was the reverse of what w s intended. 
The failure of the United States to apply strong and open 
pres ui-e from the beginnin g and the military successes of 
this per1od e.naoura ge.d the militant ne.t1onal1ets, and the 
liberal element never had a ebance to regain contPOl . 
The seeond error was the failure - of the United States 
to coopePilte t'tllly with the L•ague of ~at1ons, a failure 
Which came after the State Department realized its first 
e-rror in judgment . The taet that the League ,ra.s never com-
pletely eonf'ident of American support encoura ged th tor• 
gan1sat1on to move w1 th extreme caution, and 1 t was this type 
of caution that led to tha ·t body 1 s downfall. 
The policy of moral pressure and non • ~eeognit1on or 
the puppet state or anchukuo represented, 1n this writer's 
opinion, the best possible course of notion -against Japan, 
which the facts show to be the aggressor. Economic sane• 
tiona or at-me<i toree- would probably have rea:u.lted in the war 
everyone wanted to p?"event . Nevertheless , the action which 
wa t ·aken would have had a better chance 0f suecess had it 
been immediate a:nd the result of close and comp.lete coopera-
tion between the League and the United States. Further , it 
(v) 
would have required a sincere effort on the part of all the 
nations of the world to assist Japan in her eeonom1c diffi• 
oulties . 
It is ,cknowledged that such a course would h ve had 
no guarantee o.f euceese, but, it is the firm oonvinotion of 
the writer thay such e. policy represented the only possibility 
of e pe ceful and permanent settlement. 
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(5) 
lished her domination over that country. This attempt by Ja pan 
to make China a protectorate was a direct violation of the Open 
Door policy, which had become the basis of American policy in 
the Far Eaat. In 1899 Secretary of State John Hay had obta in ed 
the adherence of all the great pov1ers of the world, including 
Japan, to this policy tti.1eh guaranteed equal economic opp~r-
tunity in China and ensured its political and territoria l in-
tegrity. 
Upon hearing of' the Twenty ... one Demands_. the United 
States voiced objections to Japan . This stand of the United 
States compelled Japan to modify her demands . The resulting 
ultimatum to China did not establish a protectorate over that 
nation but did solidify the J p.anese position in southern 
Manchuria . The Chinese accepted these modified demands by 
signing two treaties on May 25, 1915. 
The faet that the United States was influentiel in the 
partial frustration of Japan's ambitions in China at this time 
increased the bitterness that was growing in Nippon toward her 
vast neighbor across the Pacific . Al .so, the immigre.t.ion policy 
of the United States toward J pen was regarded as a grave in-
sult to that country. The Gentlemen 's Agreement of 1907, a 
voluntary limitation by Japan , had not proved too successful, 
and in 1924 Congress officially restricted Japanese immigra-
tion. These factors brought about a definite etrain in the 
relations of the two countries. 
Follow! ng World War I, the ne.tions of the world became 
vitally concerned with attempts to achieve a lasting pea ce. 
These efforts brought about a feeling of optimism that 
( 6) 
American-Japane-se relations were impttovlng and pi9eeented. hope 
that Japan w:ould respect the provisions of th ·• Open · no .or in 
Chine. 
Probably the most · ignif1ean\ step toward the geal 
of peace was the . creation of the League of ationa. 'fhe 
Unite<! t tee,. ot course. had rejected this organization. 
!ever~helese, Japsn 1f&! a member, ~n-4 mQst people, including 
man1 American#!, , looked to the Le·ague as the main hope for 
Even though it failed t -o join the League, the United 
tatea- took an actl•e pat't in the q'Qe·at for pea~e in the 
nineteen twentie • In 1922 the majot na\tal pt,wetts of the 
world, including the tfnited Stat$e and Japan, agreei upen a 
tonnage ratio tmd oene:tru.otion holiday fQr eapi.tol ehipe at 
the Washington Oon.ferenee. ore 1mpoi-tan'b to this study, 
however, wa·e the Nine Power Treaty wh1C.h re•ulted from this 
meeting. The purpose of this treaty wa~ to spee1r1cally pro-
tect China. again_st dee1.gn1ng outside powers. T'he eignUrg •na-
tions., which again iacluded the United ta.tee and Japan, 
agreed to reepect Cbirui ·•s sovereignty,. aid in maintaining 
an effective govermn.ent for China, ,1ee their 1ru"luence to 
ensut'e equal eoonamie op-portunity, and reti-ain from using 
conditlona in China to gain special rlghte. 
Japan, bJ signing the lJ1ne Power.· '1'l'e&ty, seemed to 
have gi'Yen l:lP fillJ' am.bi t1one in China and accepted the pr.in• 
oiple ot Ch1n~se ind•1>endence. Thia conception gained 
atre:ngth in 1928 when lapen became one ot the t1zty-two 
aignees or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. 'l'hia Paet, p~omoted by 
(7) 
the United States and Fr211ce, called for a solemn condemna-
tion of war and an agreement that all international dispute s 
would never be settled by other than pacific means . 
The multi-nation treaties of the twenties oertainly 
appeared to be a source of encouragement for the cause of 
world peace , but despite the acknowledgment of international 
cooperation by the Japanese government, the bitte rness tow rd 
the United States still existed. Forces of nation 1 1am were 
growing in Japan which were to make shambles of the well 
intentioned ef'forts of the treaty signers. Furthermore, the 
fruits of the Revolution of 1911 in China were beginning to 
ripen. The Kuomintang, under the leadership or Chiang Kai-she.k, 
gradually was creating a sense of unity and nationalism. It 
bees.me inevitable th .at these growing forces i n both Jspen and 
China would eventually ela8h end without question the most 
likely arena for thet clash was Manehuria. 
The, hr East 1n 19}1 
u. 3. S· R · 
CH INA 
-$'CA I, ,;:- I IV M I I,. ~ s 
/ 
( 8) 
CHAPTER I 
THE MUKDEN CRISIS 
By the nddd l. ot the 192o•s; , the Chinese Nati 'onaliete 
he.d increased th$ir · anti .. foreign ,ientiment cone1der~bly. . In 
the twe.ntie · ae-v,ral clQshes with. foreigneP1 .erupted in 
Chinese cd.tie • the wor,,t of whieb occurred 1n Hanking in 
1921 ~; This incident resulted in t1.on1ide .rable _property d.am.:O· 
age and the death oi: several Japanese_. , Bri tiah, , end American 
c,i t .izens •. G~boats of the letter two natlone we,re immedi etely 
tent up the Yangtae River to -Nanking end, tb;re• .tene4 'by tMe 
show of toree, the Cb.111ese apologized, naid reparat1o ,. and 
guai-anteed further violenee would not oecur. , Oddly enough, , 
Japanese militai-7 forces did not pa-rt1c1pate Ht thie ineid~nt, . 
This was ha~dly caused by a lack of concern in Japah but 11ae 
due to the faot that con .servativee were 1ttli in control in 
that CQuntry end tnili iant nat1onal:1am. Yhich wa• to be the 
~rwc of all th later d.!fficul ties, , waa not yet in the open . 1 
It would eem tba.t a et back such a.s this would 
have hurt the cauee of Chine$e nationaliem , but that was not 
the oaee,, Rather:, . the incident st rengthened it; - for ebor-tly-
afterwarda; Chi ng Kai-shek asserted th.at Cb.in would not meJte 
l Samuel Flagg Bemie, The United States 
.Power (lfew York: - Benr, Holt and · ompsri7 , 19 0 , p. 
(9) 
d 
{10) 
any sore tpee.tles of concession nor i-ecognif!& those alreitdy 
made. 2 Su.ch a nat1onaliet1c <lecltration partieulaitly af .. 
feoted Japan. eln•-e her righte 1n Manohul'la had. 'been ga1ne4 
,b7 treaties ot 190.$ and 1915, which wete det1n1 tely treaties 
ot cono•1eion, and would therefoff no longe• be recognile .d · 
by the Nank:ing government. 
The tac;t that Obina proteessd cot to re(iognize these 
ti,ea~1e .a did not cause 3apen to lt ·ave JAenehw-1• nor t-o die-
oontt~• tb.t •xploitatton or her 1nter•gt ·e in that l-egion. 
Mer eont1.nued preeene• incited th• -Oh!neate $114 ·aroused their 
desire to rid: th•m••l•es ot the lntruder. The Chin••• •oon 
found . that their meat et .t'ect.ive weapon wae, th• e.-.erc1 ·a1 
bc,ye1ett. fh• 1nc,reaa1ng hardehlp thi; boycott placed upon 
Japan, . howe'Ver • encou.-aged • · 191.ll tant •tt! t\l4e. theN • oa, 
which .advoeat•d po11t1ve •t•P• to m•inteJ . .n Japan••• 1nt•re$te 
in Jlenehuit1a., 
De .apt te .Japan•• •~lol tat ion o.t the region, Ghina had 
nevel9' cona1de.-e4 l •nchu•l• anything but h'eit oli'l'1. lilaetcally. 
Manchur i a ••a• lmpe~tant to Chine. ae a <let•n•t•• bufteJ' be• 
twe•n J'apan md ltuaaia md •• • dOure• of' toet. fluobuta baa 
o.ften be•n cal.led th• gtan&lo/ of Chins; eom• tllf :~ty million 
Chine ee tai-mere haci emigi,at•d into th• Jreglon to exploit 1 ta 
,agricultui-a..1 pQtent1al. At the same time, . ln spite or h••v7 
commePc1 al. exploi tat! on, few Japan••• ta~i-• haa migPated: to 
Jlanchuri•, and in the eyee or most ob.eerter,, the r,egion ••• 
i,ot only legally Chine••• as the Treaty ot Portsmouth in 1905 
(11) ~ 
bad eat .ablisl').ed, but Ch1neee in fact ae well. 1 
In June of 1928, the Manchurian dictator Chang Tsc-lin 
we.e e.saas .einated .in his railroad •car. Be had once been eloee • 
to the Japanese 'but had been gradue.lly di-1tt1ng away• and hia 
aon, Chang l!sueh-11ang. who succeeded him, he ,d beeom~ ev-en 
·more Aanti•.tapaneee. Whe break between Manchuria' a ruletll an-d 
Japan was made eomp1ete 1n December of that sme year wben 
Oheng Heueh •llang declared all.egi •an ce to Banking end be.came 
adJn1n1atrat1ve chief of anchuria.4 
It would be an unaeI'statem nt to say tbat the lapanese 
had become tla:t'med by this turn ot eyents .. Japan considered 
her !nteree;tt; in l anchuria to be legitimately gained aad vital 
to her w-elfa:re. First or all ., by 1931 Japan had eight hund red 
milli,on yen; or fortJ pet-cent of her tot.al foreign investment, 
tied up in Me.ehur1a, pa~ticular>l7 in the South Manch-u,ri• 
B 1lw1f1.5 See ·ond, lapan's econ.Olllic well being depended upotl 
her abilit7 w 1nduat:tt1a1~ze and her neai,eet and greatest ••~~ 
ket was China. l$o, 1.t J pan were to e O'nt-inue to induatri• 
alize .euceesefully, much !ilepended u on bet- ability to obteia 
coal end iJtOn from Maneauria. Another reairnn for Japan•• 
vital 1n.tereet Hi Ranohur1-s was the .fact that a poa$1ble aolu• 
tion to her food problem lay in. the ei-op1 of tnat i"egien♦-
3 ' . Henry L. St1111eon, The Far -Eastern _Ct'is!s · (New. '! o.rk: 
Harper and '.Bxtotb·e-•• ,. '.l 9 36 ) , p. li - · ' · · ' 
4 Ibid. 1 P• 24. 
5 Eleanor- Tupper end George E. McR ynolds, J•e!!l 1a 
Ameri can Publio Op1niot'l (New York: The Mac1'11lan Compan7, 
19 37 ) • p. 294 . 
(12) . . , 
Fu.rthe~, ~ome Japanese looked upon Maneh'urie. ils a possible 
outlet for the 'il' countryt s exoees population, . altbough ae pre-
' I . I • 
viously mentioned; few farmers had migrated theve by 1931 .and 
the total of 230,000 Japanese in Manchuria were ai~ost all 
involved in th• running or polie.ing of the South Manchur1• 
Railw&y., O Finally, although 1 t waa : not we'll de.fS.'ned; tber• , '. 
we.a a reeling 1n Japen that the thouaande o,f lives lost 1n 
preventing Buts1an acquisition of l' aneh~r1 • in th war ot · · 
1904•l90S had given to the Japane~e • po81t1o ·ri of ·spec.S.al in~ 
tere8t. 7 
' 
"two conflicting ide11s as to how tbeee 1n;tereste ahould 
be maintained $X:lsted in Japan. - Baron Sh1dahara, who was head 
or the Foreign Office ti-om 1924 to 1927 and fpon,; 1929 until 
the early stagee of tb• er.ieis of 19.31. had 1.ong advocated • 
cone111ator;y- policy toward Chi.na. Shidehars hoped to olve 
Japan• s economic problems by gaining t.he eontidence ot China 
and the re .at of the woi-ld in regard to Japan• s motives in 
Manchuria and.,, w1 th this confidence gained, to open vest m1u•• 
kets f$r t~ade hitheJ"to oloeea to th• Japane•e,, 
There was• however• a growing taeling in Japsn thet 
only by • more aggi-•aaive policy ooulcl Japan mai ntain her in• 
tei-este in Mane-huri a end.1 if it became nec•asary, mili tal'y 
force might hav-e 'to bt used.. lt was thiJ fe• ·ling tnat le.cl to 
th ·e intervention ii). Shantung bJ the le ,ae- coneervative govern• 
ment of Baron Tanaka in the later part oi' 1927. The moYe we.a 
6 Si1mson, op. cit.• P• 16 
1 'lupp ·er and MeReynolde, op. cit • . , PP• 294-9$ 
(13) 
caused in part by the fear of the spreading of China 's civil 
strif'e; it resulted in another vigorous boycott of Japsnese 
trade by Chins. Shortly after Je.rcis tempers cooled a bit and 
the Japanese forces were with.drawn, but the seeds of bitter-
ness had been planted and they soon began to grow . 
Nineteen Twenty-nine marked the ret urn of conserva-
tive leadership ·to Ja.pan., but by 19.31 it was becoming increas -
ingly apparent that Prime Minister YukQ Bam.s.guehi and Foreign 
Minister Kijuro Shidehara would have a difficult time main-
taining policy of conciliation toward China, . '!'he tremendous 
flood of anti -J apanese propaganda by the government of 
Cheng Hsueh-lisng was only serving to increase the influence 
of the p:r.oponents of an e.ggr eesive :Manchurian policy in Japan. 
Further, oompeti tion from newly built Chinese railroad lines 
was being felt by the South Manchuria Railway and we.s caus ing 
8 
considerable eonoern among the Je.psnese • 
The situation became explosive in the summer of 1931 
when antf ... Chinese riots broke o-µt ~n Japan~se-held Korea over 
the molesting of mlgrant fa:rmers from the latter country in 
Manchuria., Many Chinese li°ere massacred in these riots and 
the resulting incP&ase of Ohina'e boycott on Ja panese trade 
only intensified the s1tuat1on. 9 
The most severe cause of tension, however, occurred 
in June when a J .penese army officer. traveling in Manchuria, 
8 Stimson, OR• cit., P• 25 
9 Tupper and McReynold s, _o-p_, __ e=i_t • ., P• 293 
(14) 
was arrested end killed by Chinese officials. This was the 
first instance of violence against a Japanese military offi-
, 
cial by the Chinese, and the Japanese pres-s made consi.derable 
copy out of it, arousing public opinion and encouraging a 
more aggressive policy. 10 
otually, the Japanese public was not informed of all 
the facts of thi e case. The Japanese of fioer, Captain 
Shintaro Nakamura, had been traveling in Manchuria posing ae 
an agricultural expert but was in fact on a. military recon• 
nalseance mission. He was detained by Chinese soldiers -while 
on his way to the city of Taone.n . The Chinese considered 
this detention strictly a matter of routine, but upon examin-
i ng Nakrunura they claimed to heve found narcotics on his per~ 
son and also documents which proved conclueively the.the was 
a spy. There is only the Chinese version of the story to go 
on from this point. but 1 t was their contention that after his 
discovery Nakamura tried to escape and was shot by a sentey . 11 
'i'l1e complete details of the Nakamura incident may 
never be known. There seems to be 11 ttle doubt that the lat-
ter• s mission was o:f an illegal military nature. Yet whether 
the Chinese had actual proof of thi and whether Ne.kmnura vrns 
really shot while trying to escape in tead of being executed 
remains a mystery . The Japanese reaction to the case wae no 
lO The United s tates Consul e.t Mukden to the Minister 
in China, .August 20, 1931 - The Foreign Relations of' the 
United States, The Fe.r E~st 1 1931, III {Washington: The 
United States Government Printing Offiee, 1946), l 
11 Sara R. Smith, The :Manch~rian Crisis (New York: 
The Columbia Un1vers1 ty Press, 1948), p. 18 · 
(15) 
mystery, however, and most people close to the situation felt 
that this incident was a key factor in the bitterness which 
paved the way for the crisic in September. 
The Nakamure ease pointed out vigorously to many 
Japanese · the need for action in Manchuria. Few wer~ unaware 
that the loss of Japanese interests in that area would mean a 
crushing blow to Japan's economy, already in a pre carious posi-. 
tion, 
The twenties had been particularly difficult for Japen, 
A financial panic had occurred in 1920, the terrible earth-
quake had come three yea:rs later, and a benking crisis and 
famine had struck in 1927. All of these had contri .buted to a 
situation of falling prices, decreased wages, and unemploy-
12 
ment. The world depression and the Chinese boycotts .had re-
sulted in a .fifty percent decline 1n foreign trade, upon mioh 
Je.pm so greatly depended. With farms overcrowded, more and 
more Japanese were migrating to the cities; unless the country 
could expand industrially, they wculd become a burden to so-
ciety. However, with markets declining and the sources of raw 
materials beirig shut off, the hope of greater industrializa-
tion became less likely. 
As the Japanese farmer and particularly the Japanese 
youth looked at the situation, they began to feel that a fun-
drunental reorganization of the economic and social order was 
necessary. More and mor~ these discontented groups began to 
12 Tatsuj1 Takeuchi ., 
J.apanese ~iz:! {New York: 
193.5), p . 0 
War and. Diplomecy in the 
Doubleday, Doran and Company, 
(16) 
look upon greater ex ploitation of Manchuria as the answer to 
their problem and they availed themselves of military leader-
ship with its theories of p ositive action . 13 
It would seem that as long as the Minseito party eon -
trolled the Japanese government and Baron Sh1dehe.rs . remained 
the head of the F·oreign O.ffi ce, n cone iliatoey policy rather 
than an aggressive one would prevail . However, it must be 
pointed out that the po ition o:f the m11i tary , in Ja pan . at 
that ti~e was unusu al . High military otficials had what waa 
known as direct access to the enrperor. Thus, questions of 
military p olicy were often bro~ght before the emperor without 
consulting the civilian governmsnt, making it possible for the 
military to follow a course of action of which the government 
would have no knowledge . This privilege o:f direct access 
gave the military a position of great importance and enabled 
it to carry out a course of action in September in spite of 
Shidehara ' s conservative po l icy. 
The milita:ry had been much stirred by the signing of 
the London Naval Treaty 1n 1930- This treaty re-established 
the battleship ratios of. the ashington Conference, but these 
were now considered very unfavorable to Japan, no longer will-
ing to accept a position of inequality. So great was the op -
position of the mil.its.ry to this treaty that Prime Minister 
Hamagucbj was asse .as1nsted by a fanatic. The assassination 
did not result in the fall of the cabinet and Baron Shidehara 
remained the head of the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, the 
13 Stimson, op. _cit . , p. 238 
(17) 
Mineeito government, now headed by Reyiro VJatasuk1 , 14 found 
itself in a most d.iffieul t position since 1 t was opposed by 
the mill tary, which was now convinced: th.at a cono ili · tory 
policy would lead to Japan's eventual loss of her special in-
terests in Manchuria . 15 Then , with the occurrence of the 
Koreen riots end the de th of Captain Nakamura,. the opponents 
of the government held no doubts that an aggressive policy in 
Manchuria was the only possible solution to their difficulties, 
In September of 1931, high Chinese officials . were well 
aware of this growing hostility and the power of the military 
in Japan. . In spite of the relatively cooperative attitude or 
the Japanese government, these Chinese officials were con-
vinced that Japan would attempt to oeeupy Manchuria berore 
the close of the yeer. 16 The United States Minister in China, 
Nelson Johnson, reported this fact to the SecJ?etary of ·State 
on Septemb er 15 wi th the comment that aa long as China adopted 
a.n attitude inimical to Japanese interests 1n Manchuria , inci-
dents were bound to occur which could lead to 
.flict.17 
aer1oua con-
It wae not long before these fears were realized. On 
the night of September 18, 1931, at approximately 10:00 P.M., 
14 Smith, op. cit., p . 13 
l5 Takeu chi, op. o1t ., pp . 345-46 
16 Memo o:f the Ministe r in China, September 11, 1931 -
The Foreign Relations of the United States, The Far Eest, 
_!lli, III, 3 
17 The Ministe r in China to the Secretary of State, 
September 15, 1931 - ~., P• 7 
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a bomb exploded on the tracks of the Japaneee-owne~ South 
Manchuria. Railwe.y a~ tiutioka tatlon just north of the city 
of Mukden. 18 Thia explosion imnediately led to a clash be-
tween a Japanese patrol e.nd Chi nese forces in the area. Upon 
hearing the news of the fi€')1ting; Lieutenant .Colonel Shinamoto,, 
the loce.l Japanese eonunender, ordered an attack on the Chinese 
· barracks at Mukden. and by 6 :OO A.M. that objeeti ve had been 
captured, 'l'he Japanese did not stop with th is success; by 
evening of ih e nineteenth the entire city of Mukden was under 
their control. Within forty-e1 .ght hours they had taken all 
of southern Manehuria, 
The Chinese version of the incident; of eeurse., was 
that i t had been entirely unprovoked. Furthermore 1 they con-
tended that Chinese troops in the area were undeP strict or-
ders to offer no res.ist.s.nce, and followed these orders ex,p li-
citly with the exception ot one regiment in the Mukden barracks 
which had no alternative but to defend itself. 
The Ja p anese claimed self-defense. It was their con-
tention that the explosion was caused by the Chinese, end when 
a patrol led by L1eutenent Kawamoto arrived at the seene to 
imestigate , it we.s f'ired upon by a f'orce of Chinese sold:iers 
numbering between three hundred and .four hundred men. Upon 
being informed of the clash, Lieutenant Colonel Shinamoto or-
dered en attack upon the Chin ese barracks where some ten thou• 
sand troops were stationed. 19 
18 Takeuchi, op. cit., p . 340 
19 Smith, op. cit., pp . 19-20 
(19) 
When in.formed of the situation on the night of the 
eighteenth, General Shigero Bonj'o, the chief commander of the 
Japanese Kwantung Army tn M.anohuria, ordered the occupation 
of Mukden end the other eit1e of outhern Manchu:vta. The 
Japanese centention. ' ~s that with only 10;400 troo})s itt the 
entire are .a as eompartd to 220,000 Ohinese, and with the 
. . : 
lives nd property or Jap nee o1v111ans in the region in 
sel'ious j.eopar4Jt it was necessary to ect ,sWiftlJ t ,o tore-. 
st ll a sei-1ous disaater .20 
Desp,1te tbe Japa.ne .se e.xplanaticm, the sw1ftneaa and 
efficiency or its arm,J's movement and build up of munitions 
and supplies make 1t obvious that this watt not a epontan• ·ous 
action . There was 1ittle doubt that it was a tho:r,oughly 
planned . nd weU exe.c-o.ted military ope~ation . The League ot 
Nations• ColDll'J.ission of Enquiry reoognised this tact but acknowl-
edged that 11 anniee malte detailed plans ter eny poasible 
eventual! tf, and the Japanese in th-ts ease aim.ply executed j~st 
iuth a plan . 1.'b,e Oommiaeion did not jltttif'y the - Japanes, ex -
planation of self - defense yet recognized th t tbe J"apaneae 
o:fi'ieere ltnrolved mar h.ll.ve thought they wel'e acting in that 
cap city, and 1t w aot definitely eoneluded that the inci -
dent at ukden wa8 • deliberate plot~ 21 
The ver-s1on has been refuted 1n. a recent stud7 o:f 
20 Japanese Emba y to the nepartment of St te, Sep -
tembel' 24. 1931 - The or -e,i n '.Relation& or the Unl ted State 
Japan, 19_;1-.1941, l ashi??,gto~: The United States Govern• 
ment Printing Office, 1943}, II 
21 S 1th• o:e. e~t. • P • 21 
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Japan e se nationalism by Richard Storry. Storry 1 s thesis, 
which he baeks with considera b le evidence and which is ac-
cepted as accurs .te by this wr1 ter, is that the rsi lroad ex-
plosion and the entire :incident was the work of the Ja1:>anese, 
not the Chinese . '!'he operation was planned in 1 ts minutest 
detail by Colonel Ita.gi, '·Lieutenant Colonel Ishihara arid · 
Major Ha.noya, all members of the headquarters staff of the 
Kwantung Army and. possessors cir remarkable · power in that or-
ganizat1 on. All three of these men were members of an ultra-
na.ti ·on&listic .society of juni.or ermy of f'ieers known as the 
Sukurakai. 22 This se cret society; devoted ·to reorganizing the 
Japanese government e.long mill taristie lines, had failed to 
exeeute a government cou p d• etat in Tok10 earlier in th~ year 
and since 12:lat time had become more determined than ever tc, 
bring about direct action in Manchur i a. 2 3 
On September 15 the Japanese Consul General in Mukden 
reported to the Foreign -Office that a Captain Kawakami had 
' stated that e.n important incident might break out on the even-
img o;f the eighteenth ., and he had been entrusted With the cap-
ture or the Mukden e.i:rfield if this became an eventuality. 
Upon hearing this,. Foreign MinistGr Shidehara expressed his 
eoncel"n to the Minister of war, General Jiro Minami, who was 
also questioned on the matter by the emperor. Finally , 
Minami consented to send an envoy to Mukden with orders to 
, 
22 
.R:J.chard Storry, The Double Patriots - a Study of 
Ja~a;nese- t{e..tion11lis:rp. (Londoni Chetto and Windus Company, 
19 7), p. 8li 
23 · Ibid-, P • 55 
-
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General Honjo to stop an incident at ell cost. 24 
The envoy, General Taketawa, traveled to Mukden by 
tr -in, arriving on the evening of the eighteenth. Instead of 
delivering his messag e promptly, the general decided to wait 
until the next day end spent the r .est or the evening relaxing 
in a geisha house. Thus, before the message which wae sup .. 
posed to prevent a clash was e\rez- delivered to General Honjo, 
the fatal incid-ent had oocurred. 25 
It i s a known fa.ct that General Mina-mi was the only 
member of the cabinet with definite militarietie views. and it 
is bel:teved that he pretended. to reeoneile the government while 
actually encouraging the mil:1 tary p lot. Evidence ot this ie 
hie lack of ur-gency in oending General Ta.ketawa by _ train instead 
of by air, and even more i mpor tant, th& selec tion of TEtkete.wa 
in the first place. The fact is that this envoy, who was eup-
posed to go to Mukden to prevent an incident which he:d been 
plotted by m~mbers of the Sukur akai; was none oth er than th~ 
founder of that organization. although the general we.a not an 
official member due to his rank. Thus; the rema~k ble incom-
petence of su eh a high ranking officer, entrusted with so im-
portant a. task, . 1 s logically explained. Oener,al Taketswa .never 
had sny :lntenti on of stopping the inci "dent, and the Minis ter 
of Wax• lrnew that vb.en he sent him. Storry concludes by stating 
that Minami end Tak etaw ·.a were probably not 'the instigators of 
24-
Ibid. I P• 75 
25 
Ibid . I 86 P• 
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the plot, but gave it their 'whole hearted support . 26 
At first, reaction in Japan to the railroad explo-
sion and subsequent tnil1tary moves was divided. The sur-
prise of the incident brought about some criticism of the 
army, especially by Dtuo Oyama, the head of the Japa .nese 
27 Labor Party~ · · The rightists; however, constantly gained in 
strength, and as the days following the incident passed, the 
pendulum swung farther and farther toward ~cceptanc e of the 
milite.t-y's ,ggrese!ve policy. The Seiyakai Party , th e lead-
ing rival of the Minseito, did everything possible to dis• 
eredi t the eonc111Ettory policy of the current governn1er1t. 
By early December., public opinion had shif'ted drastiea1ly in 
favor of the military-. Everywhere Japimeee ci ti i.ens hs.d be..-
come eonv!noed tha. t the aeti on i n Manchuria was in self-
28 de.fense end neeessax-y to Japan's welfare -. 
The Japenese reasoning in this situs .tion was ade-
qu tely summeri21e4 by Ambaesado:r w. <JaJmron Forbes in a letter 
to the Secretary of State. Forbes explained th at the Japanese 
we:re convinced that the intervention was necessary becauee 
Manchuria was in a chaotic condition, administ1•&tivel7 and fi-
nmcially, and that thtll Chinese o1'f1e1als there were uneble 
to do nything about it. Banditry was rampant, end sinee 
there was no power to enforce order in Manehuri a except in the 
Japanese railroad area, the Japanese had no e.l ternativ e but to 
(23) 
protect their inte:re sta by establishing order tbemsel ves. 
Purthermore, . the Japanese were convinced that their e,xploi-
tation of Manchuria was &n economic necessity, end since China 
no Longer claimed to recognize the provisions of the 'l"went:y-One 
Demands which established these rights,, roi•ce becru11e nee •essary 
to preserve what Japan .felt to be rightfully her·s . 29 
It i;s interesting to note that Forbes inf ormed Stimson 
at this time that what Ja pen was doing as right an d necessary, 
but it was being done in the wrong way. In Forbes t- mind 
le.pen's position wt;).s justified even though her course of ac-
tion was not. This• of course, fi;18de the determination ef 
American poli.cy in dealing w:1 th this eri sis e.1tt:remely difficult. 
The tendency today i to look upo n Manchuria as tI deliberate 
a.et of aggression and the feel ··,ng ia that our policy should have 
been determined aGcord.1:ngl.y. This v1ri t r does not argue with 
that contention; in fact h,s h.D.s po1nt~d out that the ori!lis was 
more of an s et of aggression than was generally realized at 
that time. Nevertholess, Fo~'bes was correct 1n pointing out 
that there were extenuating oircumstanees as far as Japan was 
concerned. It becomes obvious that these circumst"'n .ces must 
be born in mind if one is to analyze properly the American 
handling of the situation . 
One of the big difficulties in this ePisis was that the 
f'aets were not out in the open. Japen contended her action was 
29 A:mbas$O.do:r · Forbes to the Seeretary of State, Janu-
ary 29, 1932, !,p~ Foreigp. Relations of the UnJted States, The 
.F'ar East, 1932, III ~Wee~ington: The United States Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1948), 109 
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etrictly a matter ot self•defen .s$ and, a.e eoon as the safety 
or Japanese residents wae aesured, she would withdraw her 
troop, ~o the1r original positions. China, on the otheP hand, 
ma:inte.1ned that the- e.ttaek wa~ etrictly of Japanese origin and 
that 1 t cqe w1 th absolutely no provocation. 'Phe Ohineee quee..-
tioned., wi tb much juetif'1eation ae the si tuat! Qn unfolded, 
Japan's intention to withdraw and openly e.dvoe ted s ne11-tral 
1nve,t1gat1oh., e course ot action whteh Japan steadfastly op• 
posed at that t!me.3.0 
Japan contended the matter should be settled. by her 
and China alone. Chin.a reeognia~d the di $$:C,.va»tage of such 
an a_rrengement and sought outside help. 'l'be day following the 
initial ~laeb .tenner JU.n1ster .of Foreign Affairs, Wellington Koo, 
visited. the United S'tatee Minister in China, Nelson Johnson, 
aeeking PJner1can leadel'sh1p in bt"ing!ng about & settlement of 
the d.iapu.te .31 the Uni t ,ed States was unwilling: to provide 
such leadership snd China, i-ee0gnizing that sh$ •ould not get 
the aesuranoe ebe aeught, deeided to bring the ca,e before th~ 
League of Nations. On September 21 Ohi•a form.ally appealed to 
the League, seeking restoration ot the status quo, pre'V'ention 
of a renewal. or the ho.st!11 ties, 9.lld .i-eperat!Ons for damages. 32 
Meanwhile, Chiang Ka1-ahek, in an address made t0 the leaders 
32 mnk "'-.t . . 1 t 4 · a. euou.i:. , op, c · • • 
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of the Kuomintang, impressed upon them the necessity of re-
maining cal m. mile the appeal to the League was being acted 
upon, and being ready to i'ight if no sa.ti sfacti on were res.-
lized.33 
33 The Min i ster 5.n China to the Secretary of St a te, 
September 23, 1941 - The Foreign Relations of the Unlted 
States, The Far .Ea st, 1931, III, 41 
CHAPTER II 
INITIAL AMERICAN POLICY 
Upon hearing of the clash at Mukden and the subse-
quent occupation of southern Manchuria, the United States 
Secretary of ~tate, Henry L. Stimson, immediately called the 
Japanese ambassador, Katsuji Debuchi, to his offic .e for a con-
ference . ·When asked by Stimson to cancel a planned trip home, 
Debuchi asserted that he had already done so. Further, the 
ambass dor expressed surprise over the Mukden incident and 
assured timson that his government would take steps to con-
trol it. 1 
ecretary Stimson states in his book, The Far Eastern 
Cr:tsls, that hie initial reaction was uncerts .in as to whether 
or not the Japanese government had sanctioned the action of 
the army in Manchuria ~2 It appears that he took the asser-
tions of the ambassador s.t face value end assumed that def1-
ni te steps woul d be taken to control the situation. It late r 
be came obvious that such was not the case ; the political situ-
tion in Ja pen gave one no assurance that simply because a 
c ivil official of the government promised a course of action, 
the army would honor that promise . The dual nature of the 
1 Stimson, op. cit., p t? 25 
2 
~-, p . 31 
(26) 
"(27) 
Jspanesa gove~nment " h.a.s al,ready been disol.lstH~d. There. seems · 
to be little :doubt th ·at in .. his ' 1n'it1al policy Seer:etarf 
tim:son. wa, ··not · entirely unaware '<if the special position of 
the JEipane$ . •~ilitar-y but did no ·t attacb " sufficient im.porii _,. 
to it .. 
Soon .af ter · the initial cla1th, St-imson reeeivtd • · com• 
munieat!on t!!Wom Mlnifte:r Johnson stating th$t the fh)k&llut-a 
incident had raised the ire ot the Japan$&& army 1n 1'1.anehuria, 
and _the k:l111ng of 8apaneite eoldieJ-s on the South Manohu.l'ita. 
fttt!iwa.y on September 1& he:4 1ne1te ·d it fJ'lto a.etion.l n1s, 
or eour,u•, was the Japiltneai.$ army•~ verislnn, but it tnibstan• 
tis.ted the gvowtng beli•t in the · aJ'Jll71·s "eponaib1.11ty ro:r tb.e 
incident . Pin:a1:ty, on Septeinbe:P 21 the State Depar-ttnent 
l'eaehed the offic:t al eone.lusion that the Mu.k4en incl dent was 
st~1e ·t1y a elasb mnong sub6rdinates ant that nei thtit- gove:rn--
~••ts W$s !n"t,olved. It was ·acknowledged that Baron ··. hideh.ara 
may have r-..al!'ed •ueh a eoup bJ' the arm.7, wh1oh l t has already 
been sh~ he dJ.d 1 but the For&ign Otfi -ce was definitely not 
e. party in the aet1on. ·and the tate Depaz.-tme.n:t was convinced 
that ta no way could this . ineiclent be te~med a violation o;f 
the, Kellogg Paet. 4 
Despite · the fact that the tate Jlepa?itm_e,.nt did not 
place blame upo.n the Japane-se- goveJ"nment .,. Sec-N-tary Stimson 
was eorw1noed; al.m.0.st . .fl'om the beginning, taat the origin of 
1 The · :1nieter in Obi.na to the . Seeretaey of State -, 
Septembel» 19, 19 · · , la .t1on& of th United 
State& The 11ur · · . 
4. St1msen.., Qf_• .e1t,, P • 34 
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·· the clash ·was· the Japanes ·e· arfm:i and the Ohinese bore no a1grt1 ... 
.ficant' re ·eponeibiiity- •. ' His agent .s ·1n th · · tield determine'd · · 
this tarly i :a·s a· telegr'am fr,0111. Minister J:ohnson on · Septel'.fll>er 
22· 1ndioe,te ;s • · Jobn&<>n. ba:slng hi$ . i,ri.fo"1!at1on en ··,a report · 
· 'from his Vtee ... oonsu l ·at MUkden, called 'the J&paneie · ,teti \1>1l-·a 
definite 'aet of aggression!S and ass ·ei,te -d: 'that the swiftness 
of the l ·atte,/>• "s t~oop ~ov·ementa -p~ee-luded any possi 'btl! try or, 
1 the clash · bel~g ,of Chines ·e ori.gin. 6 
~le reeogniting that all umies are expeetef to be 
prepal"ed: · toz, ~Y o.Gn'ifingency tb-e United States aeeepte'd the 
contention · that the S'*iftness of the Japanese m.ov·eme.nts and 
the ext:r«tm$ly well eeor41nated and etfie1e -nt oonduet ot the 
· operation wcu.•e p~oot that J-apsn was the ·aggressor. Washingto n 
, concluded that a.lthough th$ :militat7 ·autho:ri ti .ea h~4 not aetu-
ally planned the a.r.ra!r, they had -sefgeo upon a minor tneident 
to .fo~ce - a gener- ·•l' liquiciation of the& out$t .an.ting ieeu~e be-
tween t1'i:el1>.a-$lvea Gd · the Chin,es-e in th .e are-.. 7 It is now 
ele,att- that the Unit e,d Statea wae 1n ePJ:10:r in . this assumpt-i()ll 
but was eer~•ct 1n 1te belief that the For ',eign O.fl'ioe was not 
responsible t<:>r the .ariay• s action •. 
. ) P!i: a,:,;;:e ~ Wa?J.1. Un+ ted S tateti FQ:re,gn ?01107, . 12;~-~ ( . -aahlngtriiu . The Department of State Fiibl1eationa. _ . 
191+5), P, 4 . 
0 The Vie& 't1on$Ul at , Mukd~n to · tbe Ministe:r- in Clline., , 
Sept ember 20, 1931 .;. !b~ .F:o?te,1,m.,. ,Re,le,,t"!.o~s. (},f the VlJ!.t.~4 
States,. '!'he Fe:-, m.ast 1 l'.73l,. III ., 1,;9 ... 21 · 
1 lfhe. Oh~~~ :_, in Japan to tM Secr etary o.f State, ,Sep-
tember 22,.. ltJJl, .. .. : "t, ;.Fo:rei Relations c,f the lln1te4 . S te.. . a . 
Japan, 19ll-l24l~ l ''Wa.eh1rigton: · '!'he Un ~ed S~a.tes Govern• 
mentPrinting O.ffiei, ,. l(J4J), 4 
(29) 
With this interpretation of the incident, Secretary 
timson undertook e policy which has since received much cri-
tic i sm. Assuming the clash was only a local incident, Stimson 
was convinced the Japanese government could handle it . He wae 
aware of the nationalistic and militaristic sentiment in 
Japan nd did all in his power to avoid difficulties with 
those elements in order to give hidehara every possible 
chance to settle the question . 8 
On · eptember 22, Stimson s nt a note to the Japanese 
Forei gn Off1ee indiceting ths .t the United States held Japan 
responsible but would give the government every opportunity 
to work out the problem .9 The note was not made public, nor 
any ubsequent dealing, in order to avoid antagonizing na-
tionalists in Japs.n and make things difficult for the govern-
ment. St1ms on' s poli cy of no publicity was based upon the 
fear that foreign intervention would only fan the fle .mes o'f 
militarism . He felt that 1 f' the United ta te s far c.ed a set-
tlement upon Japan it would simply rekindle the old bitterness 
between thoAe countries and ruin what he called the interna-
tion 1 progress of the p st decade. 
Stimson was convinced of the good faith of the 
Japanese government because the latter had been following a 
conciliatory policy for the past ten years. Shidehara was an 
avowed advocate of the principle that Japanese economic pro-
ble ms could be settled by friendlier trade relations instead 
8 Smith, op. cit., p. 29 
9 Illi•, P .• 45 
(30) 
of conquest. His government had exemplified this spirit cf 
cooperation by bringing about the troop withdrawal in 
Shantung end participating in the London Conference. Further-
more; the Secretary was a.ware that many elder statesmen and 
business men in Japan spoke of caution and feared interna-
tional difficulties, and he hoped th t by keeping the United 
States out of the issue publicly these elements would combine 
with the government to bring Japanese policy back into line 
with western ideals. 10 It is obvious now that Stimson over-
estimated the potential of this faction and greatly under-
estimated the power of the nationalists . 
Acting upon the princi ple of not making public our 
attitude toward Japan's responsibility and with the assurance 
of that country's cabinet that it had no territorial ambi-
tions in China, 11 Stimson issued a note to both the Chinese 
and Ja panese requesting that they refrain from further hoeti-
lities.12 This apparent stand of the State Department, which 
!mplied dual responsibility, raised considere.ble eoncern 
among the Chinese. 8-oon after the inl t1a.l clash, the Chinese 
had sought merican leadership in bringing about a settle-
ment and were worried over their failure to get it. Also, 
the American attitude that governments were not involved end 
10 Stimson, op . cit ., pp • .34.-36 
11 The Ja.penes ·e Embassy to the Department of State, 
September 24, 1931 - The Forei n Relations of the United 
tates Ja en 1 1-1 1, I, 11 
12 6 Stimson, op. cit., p . 4 
(31) 
that the Kellogg-Briand Pact had not been violated oame as a 
severe disappointment to China .1.3 
Since the United States would not provide leaderahlp 
in settling the issue, China., as previously mentioned, ap-
pealed to the League of Nations for a neutral investigati on 
under Article XI which declares any war or threat of 111ar a 
matter of international e noern. Japen, of course, fe:v:ored a 
sett lement arranged by herr and China alone and would not con-
sent to such e.n investige.ti on. The United .. tate , following 
its policy of giving Bhidehara every opportunity to bring the 
m&tter under control. ca me out in oppoai tion to Chine' 6 pro-
posal f'or an investigation on the grounds that Orientals best 
~olve their differences without outside interference. Actu-
ally, however,, timsonts reason for opposing China•s proposal 
was the fear that an outs ide investigation woo.ld only inflame 
Japanese nationalists even more behin d the military end make 
the task of settlement by the government an impossible one.14 
Officiru.ly, the Council of the League of Nations had 
assumed jurisdiction over the dis -pute upon Chine• s request on 
September 21. Although opposing e.n investigation e.t this 
time; the United States decided that the League was the best 
vehicle for bringing about a settlen~nt along the lines eon~ 
sidered most desirable. On Septe mber 24 Secretary Stimson 
sent & note to the League expressing the willingness of the 
13 The Consul General at Manking to the ecrets.ry of 
State, September 27, 1931 - The F'oreign Relations of the -
United Sta.tee, The Far Esst, 1931, III, 80 
14 Stirnson, op. ei t., P • 44 
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United .tates to c operate.15 It was hi hope at this time 
th t reseure from t e League,. of whieh both China and Japen 
e~e members, ould bring about the eonf ren~e between the 
two di putants th.at would settle the i sue. 
Thus the United tate preferred the use of thi or-
gan1ze.t1en , h1ch it had refused to join and in which it had 
shown a l ok of' confide -nee. In now turnin g to the Le gue, 
a 1 ton illu trated growing awareness of the League and 
its pot ent1 · 11t1es Stimson argued- that it we. sound judg-
ment for the United ,tats to back the 1nternat1onal orga n!• 
zat1on rather, than. leader -hip 1n this ease, since it 
would now ap ear to be :.re:.-an v. the world l'ather than Japan 
vs. the tJ~ited tate. Further, time-on contended that $inc• 
t he Le gue he .d e.:lready assumed ju.risdiotion and had all the 
mechanism fo settl ng d1 putes at its dispGsal, the Uni ted 
tates would have no justif:l.cat1on at all in any c·ther eourse 
or action_ 16 
- espi te thi Ameriean po_si tion, the Leegue- was handi• 
c pad throughout the cris is by 1t e doubt as to the extent to 
which the United t"'tes would cooperate. There seems to be 
little question th t the Am rican conception of eoop .r&tion 
and hat the League h d hoped for ware not the 8$.e,. rn 
IJ:he _Manchurian ·Cria!~,. ara i mi th eri tie! -es tiinson cQna1d ~ 
e:r$bl.7 .fo;r the rather reserved -epp:roa.eb. toward cooperation 
taken by the Stat e Department-. iss Smith contends that 
1.5 . - J,6 Ibid., P• t+ ' 
lb Ibid .• , .P.• 40 
(33) 
An);er1can eooperat1 on .with the League · should have been carried 
out to the tulle et •Uttent. Thie wr-1 ter a.greeeJ that 1.t 'the 
United States we:r:e determ.1ned to r,li upon the League,. 1, 
mould h•ve granted that oPganizat~on ~t-~ complete eupport. 
Thi~ was not Stimson's policy , how•v.er. A. carefUl . s~u,~y . of 
hie note _to the L.eape on Octobel' .$ .lll&kea 1 t obv.i ·ous that the 
Leegue could nQt clepend upon the United State-•• The eeeretary 
stated .in th1s · n·ote- tb .at the Un! te ·cl States would •et inde -
pendently _thrcugh tts diplomatic repre ·sente.tives te reinferee 
Leagae action. 17 Meenllbile, altht>11gh pro:te•l!1ng to be :rely-
ing upon the League mechaniam. ·t1ms-on sent two envof&, 
E" Lawrence Sa.lisbuey and George o. llan.son., to .Ma.neb.ur1a to 
I . 
b~1ng ·b•~~ inr~~~tion. 18 Thi$ was not &a inve tigat ·ion and 
' • '. k • 
in ract met with Japan• ,• appttoval; neverthelea • it was appa:r .. 
ent to the Leagu, th.at American euppor.t at tb.1e time might be 
no ditfei-ent f'ro.ri'l 1 tB p"vioua record ot non-cooperation. 
Obviously, 8t11D8on di~ not mean to cnate thia 1mpreae1on. but 
the :t.e-agu♦ had good reaso -n t<> b• ·suap1o1ous ot the metiivef ot 
the United St•tes toward tt, end an expreeston ot independent 
e.etion et this time could do nothing b:tlt enhance that feeling. 
Th.ere ia no question that conclusive action depended upon 
American eupport, ,md because of this the League moved with 
e~treme caution. 
17 Bisson, T. A., American Policy in the Far East 
1931-1241 _ (New York; . International Secretarial Institute of 
Pacific Relet1ona, 1939), p. 22 
18 
.Smith,. op, .1 pit .• , P • 70 
(34) 
This contention is strengthened by the fact that the 
Le gue•s first official action met with no .American comment. 19 
On eptember 30 the Council, expressing a conviction that 
China would protect the llves and property of Japanese 
· Nationals and that Japan had no territorial ambitions in 
Manchuria, formally requested that both parties do all in 
their power to restore normal relations . 20 This would have 
been the time for a positive statement of support by the 
United States.. It is true that this action by the t,eague was 
not of much significance; nevertheless , positive support 
rather than the note implying independent action would have 
given the League a much needed feeling of confidence in 
· Jt.meri can coopers.ti on . 
Despite the uncertainty of the American position, the 
lull in military activity prompted a growing optimism that a 
peace.ful solution might be realized . This feeling received a 
rude jolt on October 8, however, when Japanese planes bombed 
the City of Chinchow . Chineho, lo cated more than 100 miles 
southwest of Mukden and at no place closer than 50 m~lea from 
the South Manchuria Railway, had recently become the tempor-
ary capital of Chang Hsueh-liang . 21 The Japanese claimed 
their plsnes were on a military reconnaissance missi on, since 
Chinese troops were concentrated at Chinchow, and dropped 
19 Smith, op . cit . , P • 73 
20 The Verdict of the League, China and Japan in 
Manchuris The Re ort of the Assembl (Boston: The World 
Peace Foundation, 1933, P• 2 
2 1 Smith, op . cit., P • 83 
( 3.5) 
bomb~ onl1 after being fired upon. 22 
The nations or the world did not aceept the Japanese 
explanation and were shocked by the d&st~ction of oiv111an 
prope~t7 and the killing o! women and oh11dl'en aa well ~so~ 
military peraQnnel,, The bombing had cellte within ferty--eigb,t 
hours of the time Ja an had announeed it ould no longer 
recognize the authol'ity of Chang H.ueb-lieng and had drepped 
leaflets ·referl'ing t ,o the anehu.itian l.eader e.s a tt st1nk1ng, 
rape.¢1oua youtn.• 23 
?!he eff .icial reaction of !~aron h!dehar · and the 
Jepenes-e . For~ign Oi'fiee wsa that the bombing \fas. an isolated 
'incident of no :real 1mpoP·tanee to the solution or the 
Manchurian proble.JA. 24 eeretery Stimson immediately 1n~ 
ati'uctea the Oha:rge' d 'a:rfair s in Japan to issue · protest to 
8$ron Shi deha.ra. Tb.1 s pr,ote t, however• was · not made pub 11 e • 
StiiQOn ,ras atill stt-iving to allow ehidehara to gain contr ol 
of the situation, and as far ae th Amer1¢an public we eon• 
ce~ned, the ehinohow bombing had ca1;1.l:l,ed no- sel"1ou-s eoneex-n 
1n the State Depa.rtm~n.t9 
lt ie obvjoue the official American Ettti tude was be-
ginning to change.. The Japanese Foreign ttice wee 'informed 
22 The Charg; 1n Japan to the SeePetary of State, 
Oe · l-. The Forei,m Relations ot the United _Stat1a , 
,.......,,_;;;a,.....,;..~;;...;;::.:s.1, r. 18 
23 
· · t ·1 a~ mi h, op . c t., p . -~ 
. ' 
24, . 
Memorandum of under Se.oreta~ of State Oastle , 
October 12, 1931 • !lbe Foreign Ite1at1one . of thc;t United Statep .1 
The. Far East, 1931, ~II , 16$ . 
(j6) 
that the bombing cou.16 not be Wl1n1m1.1ed not- contdde .rei u.n-
import«rit • . Chinohow wae more than 50 miles trom the South 
lfanehuria !htilwq and the Ch1neee he.4 eYer7 right to concen-
trate troope there. Ftlrthel"fllOJ'e, the proteet cont1:mu.ed, th 
United Stat&.a considered the bombing ot . cities and ·civilians 
t o l!>e completely unjustif i ed and th• Japanese exple.!'iation of 
the situation inadequate. 25 
Shid&hara immediately replied to Stimson that he did 
not mean to minimise · th~ incident, but it was 6n isolate d 
military aot1on end did not represent the real attitude of 
the Japanese government. 26 Upon reflection, this tatetnent 
almost seem, like an admission bJ Shidehara that the Japan$te 
government was lo■ing rather than gaining control or the situ-
ation. 
Amazing as it may aeem, ecretary St1meon never dis-
euiseed the anchurim. ei tuet.ion with Pree:t dent Hoov r until 
after the bombing of Chinchow. Unquestionably. the reason 
was th ·a t ltoover wa$ too preoccupled w1 th the American finan-
ci al er i ei e; yet thve-e weeks is tar too long a tine · f'o-r the 
State Depa?>tment to b:e conducting a me.jo:. policy without preai .. 
dent!al oon!ti l.t t1on. At this time, however.- the President 
ag reed w1 th timson th~ t the United ~tates sb.ould a.it jointly 
r:ith the League in the forthcoming discussions a-s long am 
they oentereq around t he Kellogg Paet. Hoover was eonvineed 
25 The se ·ere t ar y of' State to t he Char ge' i n J apa n, 
October 13, 1931 .. The FoPeign :R.elations of the United tatea 1 
Je.pan, _1931 ... 12!+~• I ., 20 
26 :&rsmora~dum of the Secretary of State, October 12, 
1931 - .ll?.,!!., pp. 22-23 
(37) 
the Kellogg Pact would be a less offensive instrument to 
Ja pan than the Nine Po er Treaty. 27 As has been seen, this 
was the opposite view from that of Stim on who favored the 
use of the l tter document. There is no question that 
Stimson was beginning to consider a stronger poli ct s.t this 
time but was still a long way from meking any decided change. 
This slowness wee primarily due to Stilnson' s deter mination to 
carry out his initial policy , but the cautious Hoover also 
contributed to this delay. The fact that Hoover did exert 
influence upon the Secretary is evidenced by the acceptance 
by the latter of the Kellogg Pact appro ch. 
On October 16 the United States ac ce pted the invi ta• 
tion of the League to send a delegate to sit in with the 
Counci 1 deliberating upon the Manchurian crisis. 
Prentis B~ Gilbert , the Consul in Geneva, was instructed to 
participate only in dieous ions which involved the Kellogg 
Pact. 28 Many in the United States supported the decision to 
send a representative to the League, but many isolationists 
wer e just as vehemently opposed, The powerful Hearst news-
papers used the headline nHeaven Help Us" to describe the move 
and indicated that war would be its most likely result. 29 
The Japanese violently opposed this conference or the 
Council and in part1 cular the deci Edon to 1nv1 te the United 
States to participa te without the eoneent o~ both parties to 
27 Smith, op. cit., p. 86 
28 6 Stimson , 012. cit., p . 3 
29 Tupper and McReynolds, op. cit., p . 299 
(38) 
the dispute. The powerful General Minemi declared, nThe fun-
damental policy of Japan to seek aettlanen t of the Manchuri m 
affair through direct negotiations cannot be modified ••• • 
No good can be accomplished by the intervention of the League 
or any third party W'l.O possesses no knowledge of the situa -
tion . "30 
Despite Japen'a objections, Gllbert eat in on the 
conference, whose first off'icial act was to request all of 
its members to send independent notes to China and Japan call -
ing attention to their obligations under the Kellogg Pact . 
The United States was in agreement with this move and sent 
its notes to both powers on October 20. Immediately follow-
ing the sending of these notes , however, Gilbert was taken 
off the eommission . 31 There is no doubt that the Japanese 
objection _s to Amer·i can partic i pation in the conference wor -
ried the State D$partment, and Gilbert was withdrawn in en 
effort to avoid any .further complicationE; with the Japanese, 
who were still being coddled in an effort to enhance Qhidehara's 
liberal position. As far as the League was concerned, the re -
moval of Gilbert was another indication that it could not rely 
upon American support. 
The action of the Couneil w a climaxed on October 24 
with the proposal of a resolution which eall ed upon th~ 
Japanese to withdraw their troops baok into the railroad zone 
by November 16 and f'or the Chines~ to make arrangements for 
30 Takeuchi• OE• cit . , P• 359 
3l timson, op. eit., p . 66 
(39) 
retaking the proposed evacuated territory provided full pro -
tection was accorded to Japanese property and lives. The 
resolution · also provide .d for direct nego~1at~one between the 
two 4:leputants ence the Japanese wit}ldrawal was .eomplettd.3 2 
l 
Resoiutione of the Council, under Article eleven, however, 
needed un•nimous approval including that ,of the dispu~an te, 
and this one failed ,to get it because Jap~n, a Council me•• 
bett, would not give its consent. I!\ ttejeeting the reeolu-
tion, the Japanese e.tated that they WO\lld not w1 thdt-aw their 
troops and wou.ld accept &. Joint Japanese-Ohines •e conf er,ence, 
only if it were based on certain :.fundamental points. The 
Japanese stipulationa were that both countries repudiate 
aggressive polieJ, th .at Chinats territorial integrity be re-
epected, th$t all movements 1nt-er:r-er1ng with freedom -or trade 
be suppreeaed, that all peao-etul pu11sults of Japeneee na -
tionals in Ulchurla be protected, and that complete respect 
be given to all Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria. ?t must 
be adde4; however , that at the time or the rejection ot the 
Counc-1.11 s resolution .Japan was not int-trested 1n a solution 
even on these desirable terms. Thie is indic ted b·y the tact 
that while the Council was in e sion the Japanese spoke of 
.five fundamental points but did not make them ubl1c until 
arter the Council had adJourned.3 3 
This p~opos 1 and the manner in whlch it was pre .. 
sented after the Council had adjourned were an open def1ano~ 
32 The Verdiet of the League, China and Japan in 
Manchuria, op, clt.; P• 31 
33 Stimson, ;9:P• o1t., P• 68 
o.f the Ltfague by J pan. 
{40) 
Obviou$ly sueh · -a &&ttlement wottld , 
' . 
nave eliminated ' the Chinese 'bo~reott ~bc! eOl'llpletel.y eetab -l1ahecl 
,lapanese domination · or Manchuri · • !J:he d.egre to Wh!eh Ame~1can 
Ul'l'lrillingneas to go along with th& l,eagu~ en"ouraged tp.1.s 
3 p.anese position is uneertaln. 'l'he~e SEU~l\l(i to be no doub-t,, 
however, tliat it did pt ·y a pai,t . It 1$ poss1bl t h at Japan 
•oul.d have d-efie~ the League regardleas t;,f the Ame~iean p G)$1-
t1on , but 1 t i 4t>ubtful th t she would heve done so ~s qqiokly 
and with such boldnese . 
1l'b.e Um.ted States indicated that 1t would probably not 
auppo~t any tore fu.l t,ee.gue action by sending Gilbert as its 
, 
envoy. HlJ.gb Glbeo-n, the Amb ssadel" t-o Belgium, and H,ugh .il~on , 
the Minister to Swi tz -erland; e~e both ot gr ate~ diploma tie 
rank and influence than Oilbet.>t-t and both were available and 
willing to trtend,.;4 It 1.s- obvtou.s that · the United States 
wanted to a"Vo14 sevious &ntangleinents, eo 1t ,ent one of the · 
lesser me:mbe:r of its dipl®atie family.- As it this were not . 
evidence e.nougb. 1 the attitude of th-e 'United States was made 
e·onolusi ve by the wi thd~awal o-f Gilbert be.f oi-e the C--ouneil 
adopted its re.eo1ut1on. 
One ex lan ·tion or this cautious policy li&s 1n a 
definite eot:i:fl.1et of a:ttitudes within the S"& t D$p11Wtment , 
There were some., like the -ebief oi' the 1eJJ Eastern Division , 
• K. Hornbeck, who were definitely pro.Chinese . However , 
th e gre . est 1nfluenee in th.e departni&nt . wee exeJ't&d by 
,. 
• R, Castle • a fo,:.m.er Armb'assador to Japan and an. aeknowl ... 
(41) 
edged sympathizer with that country ... A week after the initial 
clash at Mukden, Castle h ad asserted after a conversation with 
Ambassador Debuchi the.t it was obvious the.t the Premier and 
Shidehara were regaining control end a settlement was irrimi• 
nent ,.35 It is known nQw that this was definitely n.ot the · 
ease. Furthermore~ Castle was known to be a close personal 
Triend of the President ., a fact which contributed to his in ... 
flue nee -. 
The initial, very cautious policy of the United States 
was designed, therefore, not to antagonize Japan but to avoid 
any positive ae t1on .. President Hoover and Secretary Stimson, 
as has be en shown ., were influenced e.ppreei s.bly by Under-
secretary Castle ., end were convinced that e.ny definite action 
might be disastrous. They were particularly concerned that 
the League Counei l might resort to economic sane ti ons :,. · -a move 
which wes w1 thin the power or that organization ,. There ,is .no 
question that it was the fear of being invo+ved in such & 
step that prompted the removal of Gilbert from the Council dis-
cussions .. The American leaders felt that econonde sanctions 
would be a terrible biew to our sagging e·conomy a.nd might even 
precipitate war .. The depression ., the weakened position of the 
navy in the Pae1flc due to the Washington and London Confer-
ences, Hoover's Q,uaker background, and strong isolationist 
sentiment in this country precluded any policy that might even 
remotely threaten war,. 
35 Memorandum of Under Secretary Castle, September 25, 
1931 - The Foreign Rela tt o~~ of the Uni,!;ed States, '.Che Far 
East, 1931, III, 67 
(42) 
Thus, Japan was allowed to consolidate her gains in 
Manchuri:e. with nothing more than n expression of the world ' s 
concern. The United States showed that it was fearful of the 
consequences of opposin g Japan, and our policy seemed only to 
encourage her to further aggress~on. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE STIMSON DOCTRINE 
Although it rejected the League resolution of Octo-
ber 24, the Japanese government claimed that it did not in• 
tend to expand the .Manchurian conflict. This promise was 
broken in early November, however, with the atta ck upon 
Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, Manchuria is nothern-
most province. 1 
An internal struggle between two Chinese leaders in 
northern Manchuria had resulted in the destruction of a rail-
road bridge over the Nonni River . The bridge was located 
thirty miles south of the junction of the Chinese Eastern and 
Taonan-Angs.nchi Railroads; its destruction interfei-ed With 
the now of traff'ic including much needed food to the South 
Manchuria Railway. Japmese authorities of the latter line 
demanded the bridge be repsi red immediately. When no assur-
ance of such action was given by the Chinese, Japane se laborers, 
accompanied by military troops, were sent to put the bridge 
back into operation . On November 4 the Jepanese force ar-
r i ved at the Nonni River and cl ashed with Chinese troops in 
the area . By November 6 the Japanese had gained control of 
the river and repair work had begun. 2 
l Stimson. op. cit., p . 70 
2 . . Sw.i th, op. cit., pp . 129-30 
(44) 
(45) 
l'hen confronted by Se cretar y Stimson with a query 
about the new outbreak, the Japanese Ambassador asserted that 
the troops were only to be used to protect the reconstruction 
of the bridge, and there was absolutely no intention to launch 
an off en 1 ve from the Nonni River . 3 As usual, however, this 
was the promise of the Japanese government not the military. 
General Honjo, the military commsnder in Manchuria, had or• 
ders from Tokyo not top ss a line fifty miles southeas t of 
Tsitsihar. The general ignored these instructions, however, 
and issued en ultimatum to the Chinese leader in the region, 
General lJI:a Ohan-mhun, demanding that he evacuate his capital• 
When the ultimatum we.s rejected, General Honjo launched an 
attack on Tsitsihar and captured the city on November 19.4 
As a result of this breach of faith by the Japanese 
Secretary Stimson recognized that his policy of' conciliation 
we.s not going to work and that a more positive stand must be 
taken. Another factor unquestionably contributing to this 
feeling was a telegram from Ambassador Forbes. received the 
day before Tsi tsihs .r fell, which aeknowledged that rumors 
were strong in Japan that the conservative government, whom 
the Stat e Department had tried so hard. to assist, was about 
to ra11 . 5 
On November 21 Stinwon again called in the Japanese 
3 Stimson, op . cit., p . 70 
4 Smith, op. cit., P• 131 
5 The Ambassador 1n Japan to the Secretary of State, 
November 18, 1931 - ~he Foreign Relations of the United 
States, The Far East, 1931, III, 474 
(46) 
Ambassador who assured him that the troops would be withdrawn 
from Tsitsihar as soon as . possible and that hi government 
was now willing to consent to a neutral investigation. 6 For 
the first time, Stimson did not eecept the Japanese govern-
ment's assurances and declared that the United States consid-
ered the attack upon Tsitsihar a direct violation of the multi-
lateral peace treat1es 1 and that hereafter all deliberations 
between the United States and Japan would be made publio .7 
Thus, a milestone in American policy was reached. No longer 
would the State Department keep its negotiations with J apa n 
secret and attempt to make the American public regard the 
situation s a minor incident that could easily be put under 
control by the Japanese government. At last Washington was 
aware tha~ the military was in complete control. The exces-
sive care that had been taken not to embarrass the liberal 
civilian element in the government had the opposite result 
from that intended. The .American hands off policy had not 
helped the government but had given the military chance to 
gain complete dominance. It was now obvious to the Stcte De-
partment that to continue the preeent policy would be :futile. 
There c an be no question that Stimson• s move was a. 
wise one. but it undoubtedly would have been more erfective 
6 Memorandum of the Secretary of State, November 21, 
The Forei n Relations of the United tates Ja en 
.;:;;...i;..:.;;....:;:~-1, I• 
7 emorandum of a teleohone convers ation between the 
Secretary of State end the Secretary General in Geneva, 
November 21. 1931 - The _Foreign Relations of the United 
States, The Far East, 1931, III. 515-23 
(47) 
had it been made sooner. The Japanese were now becoming ex -
. tremely ) nb1tious, in large part due to the encouragement 
given · to them by the cautious American policy. Reports were 
beginning to come in that ·they were now eying Chinchow . 
Chang Hsueh•liang had established this city in the south as 
his capital, and it represented the last stronghold of the 
Chinese north or the Gre•t Wall. Control of Chinehow meant 
complete domination of Manchuria for the Japanese. The re-
ports were that they were building up supplies and troops 
nes.r the city, . snd General Honjo was threatening to attack if 
Ohang Hsueh-lia.ng did not evacuate .·8 
Again Secretary Stimson called in the Japanese Ambas-
sador, but this time he did not seek any assurance . The Am-
bassador was informed that the United States considered the 
Chinese forces in the Ch.inchow area no match for the Japanese, 
and that the latter were in no danger of attack. Further, 
the Amerio e.n government oould see no just1t'icat1 on or excuse 
for an attack on Chinehow, sna it it occurred it could be 
considered as nothing but an act of aggression. 9 
As expected, the Japanese Ambassador implied that 
there was no need for American concern, but by this time his 
assertions merited little regard. The American military at ... 
taehe' in Tokyo, Golonel Meilroy, had been sent to Manchuria 
and confirmed that the Japanese were making military prepe .ra -
8 Snii th, op. oi.:t . , p • 188 
9 Memorandum of the Secretary of State, November 22, 
1931 - The Foreign Relations of the United States, The Far 
East, 1931, III, 534-35 
(48) 
tions aimed at Chinchow. The Colonel informed the Stete De-
partment that the assurances of the Japane se government were 
meaningless since the army, not the cabinet, was determining 
policy in Manchur1 a. 10 Also, a. re p ort from the Minister in 
China indi oated that the Japa n ese intended to destroy the 
final power of Chang Hsueh - l i ang in order to protect e probable 
united puppet government in Manchuria. 11 In late October 
nominal municipal and pr ovinci al governments had been organ-
ized and in l ar ge pert admini stered by the Japanese. This 
fact see med to be a forerunner of e new Japanese-dominated · 
government for Manchuria whi' ch ro uld not be able to exist un -
less a,11 Chinese authority in · the ares. wa s eliniina.ted. 12 
Largely due to the protest of Secret ary Stimson and 
also simil ar ones from the British and French Foreign Offi c es, 
the Japanese called off the impending operation st Chi nohow. 
This halt only proved to be temporary, however, and ca me after 
a misunderstanding of some remark s by t imson which nearly re .. 
sulted in serious consequences . An Associated Press report 
in Japan of a press conference quoted the Secretary a s saying 
that the Japanese claimed to be only protecting their inter-
ests and repeatedly had given assurances that they would make 
no aggressive moves. Yet, they had attacked one city after 
another. The re port indicated further that Sti mson had stated 
lO The Assistant Military Attache in .Tape.n to the 
Ad jut ant Generel, November 28, 1931 - Ibid. , p. 582 
11 The Minister in Chins to the Secretary of St te, 
November 26, 1931 - .ill.£., P• 569 
12 Stimson, op. cit., P• 192 
<49) 
he was losing patience with the Japa.nese and warned that an 
attack on Ch1nehow would destroy entirely the peaceful nego-
tiations now taking place .13 
The Japanese press made consfderable copy of Stimson's 
remarks e,.nd provoked a bitter public denunciation of the 
Secretary and the United States. It also raised a. storm 
against Baron Shideha:ra who was accused of revealing military 
secrets in assuring • timson there would be no attaek upon 
Chinchow.14 
Stimson, through Ambessador I<~orbes, der.tiecl the press 
version of his . remarks. He stated he had simply been 1n-
. f'ornied by pre ,se dispatches of an impending attack and had ex-
pressed his hope to the Japanese ..Ambassador th at there was no 
basis for such reports. 1.5 It is obvious fus.t Stimson did not 
make the ste.tem.ents attributed to him by the press, but 1 t ia 
also evident, as has been shown, that h:ts talk with the 
Alnbaasador was a great deal stronger than he was willing to 
sdmit publicly . Baron Shidehare vigorously denied he he .d 
given away militery secrets, and the controversy died almost 
as quickly as it had been born. 
The s i tue .tion quieted because Japan had decided to 
l.3 The Amba,ssador in Japan to the Secretary of State, 
No. vemb. er 28, 1931 ... The Forei~n Relations or the United 
State-s z Jap~na 19Jl--19h.l, I, 1 .. 52 
14 Tak euehi, op. cit., P• 367 
l.$ The Secretary of State to the Ambsesado:r in Japan, 
November 28, 1931 - 'fhe Forei~n Relations of the Unit~d 
St ates z J ep an, 19 31-19[1 , I, 3 
(50) 
follow a new course in regard to the t,eague and bade lled a 
halt bo the Ohinchow optretion. 'fb:18 aet might s•em to be an 
1nd.1oat1on that the a<>vernment was regaining oontrol, eut 
au.en wae not the ca:.ee. The Japaneee had almost eompletel1 
• .olidified their potai titn in ManohUl'ia and well'• now suggesting 
that an 1nve&tigat11\8 oommi sion be • ·Jt•bl11hed11 Thia eoul'se 
wae ad:voc·ated in or4er to prevent punitive action by the 
Le.a,gue~ Br1t1eh 1 French ., m .d Amf!riean protee'be oveP the poe-
tfbl• attack upon Qhfnchew had incU.~atei t.o the J•pene•• that 
a tonttnuat1oi1 or th♦ operation might iaeeult in. th .e L•ague 
taking un.t'avorablct att10n against them. An 1nTeatigat1on 
would. give the Jap.ane&e time to complet.• th•1r da:n1na.t1cn or 
Manelu1r1•• while pun1tlve a.ctlon at this point Jllight undo •11 
the mlli t&:r7 ha• acU~Olllt11ahed. 16 
W1 lh Japan .now adToc•tb1g I policy almost c~1•t•l'Y 
oontrary to h•~ original one, the Oouncil cf the League re~ 
oon••ned in P·arie . on Jlovember 16. One♦ more the United Sta tea 
d•c14ed to ••-~ ·• reprta -entat1v• to \be prooeedinga, thi :e time 
.ael•oting Charle .a G. »••••• fb6 Jmba1a•aor to t;oruton. ,Mueh 
crlt1oi1m hat been val :•d GTet- the ••J.•ct1cn ot D.•wes. Despit• 
the prominence or the rorm•r Vice•P~eaiclent, hi& d1pi()n):at1c 
experi.enoe for- auch . • te.ak wae queatloneble.. Alao, h!-s tr1end-
eh1p with the laparu,1• Ala:'ba•aad.or t -o London.- fetlneo M•.tsud•l~•, 
baa brought aecusattone that he waa Pl'<i>•lapaneae. t:n light ot 
• statement mad• to X.atau.44i,1ra upen a via1t by the latter to 
hla hotel suite. there •••ma to b• aome juat!.f'ication tor thf.a 
(51) 
view. At this time Dawes declared: uThe Chinese are alto-
gether too cocky. Whet you people need to do is g ive the m a 
thoroughly good licking to teach them their place and then 
they will be willing to talk sense . " 17 The biggest criticism 
of Dawes., however, was the fact that he stayed a ay from the 
council meetings and conducted all his business in his hotel 
su1 te . This unavailability of tb.e Amerle an representative 
again raised the doubts among the League powers as to just 
whet extent they could depend upon the support of the United 
Ste.te.a.H 3 
Desp ite the uncertainty of the .American position, the 
Council accepted the Japanese proposal; by a resolution of 
December 10 it established a neutral commission of inquiry . 
This commission, when formed, consist ed of the Earl of Lytton 
representing England as chairmen, General Henri Claudel of 
France, Count Aldrovandie -Marescotti of Italy, Dr . Heinrich 
Schnee or Germany, and Major General Frank McCoy of the 
United States . It's members were responsible to the League, 
not to their individual countries; it was to go to Manchuria 
to aseertain the facts and present them to the League for 
adjudication . 19 
The United States wa~ very much in favor of the reso-
lution of December 10 , which also included a promise by Japan 
17 Ferrell , Robert .H., American D1plomacz in the Great 
Depression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957}, P• 146 
18 L Smith , op . cit ., p . lol 
19 Stimson, op . cit., p . 206 
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to refrain from furth e r hostilities . Secretary Stimson ex-
pressed his approval in a note to the League sent immediately 
upon the adoption of the resolution and also allowed General 
McCoy to participate in the inquiry . 20 
The creation of the Lytt on Commission did not repre-
sent as significant a step as many believed. The initial 
clash we.s already three months in the past, and by the time 
the com.mission was able to organi •ze and get to Manehuria, the 
evidence was no longer fresh. 1'urthermore, the investigation 
had not come until Japan was ready for 1 t , and 1 t now served 
that country's aggressive ambitions . While the United States 
and the League awaited the findings of the Lytton Commission, 
the Japanese were granted the time necessary to meke their 
domination of Manchuria complete. As a consequence the reso -
lution a.nd the creation of the Lytton .commission ended in 1 
promoting rather than hindering Japen 1 e designs. · 
On December 11, the day following the establishment 
of the Commission, the Minseito cabinet fell from power. 
There has been some dispute as to the eause of this fall. 
Sara Smith , for instance, states that the fundamental ea.use 
was the inability of the goverr~ent to meet the financial c ri~ 
21 
sis. More likely, however, is the contention of 
Tatsuji Takeuchi, in his excellent study War and Diplomacy in 
the Japanese EmEire, that an internal struggle within the 
Minseito Party over its handling of the Manchurian question 
20 Report of the League Assembly, op. cit., p . 38 
21 8ml th , op . cit . , p. Sl 
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was the maJor cause of' the cabinet's resignation -Pe.th.er than 
its :financial progl'am . 22 At any rate, the government fell, 
e:nd oa De~em:ber 13 an•• cabinet was formed by the rlval 
e1yuka1 Part,- •1 t.h 'l'Akeshi ·Inukai as pl'em:ieza and 
Kenkichl Yoehisa<WQ as · forelgn m1n1ete:r _. 23 · 
The new govermnent proved to be mu.eh more sympathetic 
to the 1d$a.- of the m111 ta:ry leaders th.$11 tte p,redece&s .or. 
At a meeting held on »•~emb&r 17 the e.ab!net ace.epted th re• 
quest o~ the new a:, M1n1ste~, G•neral. Sadao APaka i ~ to .eend 
re1nte.l!'oements to th Ohinobow area to eaiat 1n the drive 
against Chine.$e 'bandtt ·s. The Japanese contended that t e 
0h1nette had b.a:-oken the -ir word by not avacuating the1~ t~oope 
from Ohinohow and we:tte unable to control band.1 ts running w:tld 
in the area_ 24 Oolonel. Moilroy, the .Al'lter1can mllita:ry ob•er -
'Vet- in J,fanoh'tlria, confirmed the new build up or. Japanese 
troops, reporting that
0
ndlitat7 headquarters in Mukden had in -
f'o:x-med him that the purpose wa to put down Oh1nes tu.~nd1 tst 
and there was no intetition or taking Chinehow 11' th~ Oh1neee 
troops wer~ wit-hdrawn ~ The, Colonel doubted, however, t.he 
Japanese wo ld not go all the way. 25 
Oo.lonel Mcilroy proved to be a wise prophet. The 
alleged .operation agEi.1nst Chinese bandit~ began on December-
2) lh!,g, ... P• 361 
24 ll?td•, p-. 36g 
2.S The M.111 t ,t;1.ey Attach~ in Japan to the Ad jut nt 
Genet'al .. The Foreign Relations of the United States, _ 'l'b~ 
Far Eaet 1 l9JJ, III , 689 
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23, and one week later, with Japanese forces attacking the 
outskirts of Chinchow, the withdrawal of the Chinese troop8 
in the city began. By January 3 a~l the Chinese troops were 
out of the city, -and. the Japanese occupation of Chinchow had 
been officially aoco~plished . The Japanese then proceeded to 
make contact w1 th th e ir troops stationed at Shanhaikwan, just 
south of the Great Wall . With this Chinese authority eom-
plete ly disappeared from southern Manchuria . 26 
The military events following the fall of the Minseito 
Cabinet were regarded with grave -eoncern by the J'l..meri can State 
Department . Secretary Stimson , as mentioned, had given up 
hope of helping the Japanese government find its own solution 
after the fall of Tsitsihar and the initial movement upon 
Chinehow . Still, there had been no definite - statement of 
American policy . Stimson now realized, with these new de-
velopments, tha .t the United ... tates could no longer a.ppe .ar dis-
interested and th.at a definite stat;ement of policy was neces .,. 
Two days before he made an oi'fic ial pr ·onouncement, 
Secreta;r-y Stimson explained in a departmental memorandum the 
, 
reasons for the need of a chenge in policy. He stated that in 
several instances Japan had used military force to obtain na -
tional objectives and was; therefore, viola.ting the Kellogg 
Pact . :Further, the Secretary contended that despite the $b ... 
sence of any formal !'esistance by Chinese troops, the Japanese 
had destroyed the administrative integrity of the government 
26 The Repor-t of the Leagu e Assembly, op . _ei t . , 
pp. 39-4-0 
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of China in Manchuria. The Japanese had broken a . solemn pro-
mise, made in the Council of the League on December 10 , to 
re.t'rain .from any new initiative which would reeult in loss of 
li f e and to keep only enou gh tr .oops in M:an-0huri a to protect 
the Sout h Manchuria . Railway. Stmson concluded that the at-
tack on Chinchow was a definite b re eh of this promise and 
.called for positive .action by the United States . 27 
Stimson ealled in the Japanese Ambass dor prior to 
delivering the note .:tnfo:nning him t h.at while the United States 
wa..s reserving final judg n:-ent unti 1 :l t had seen the report of 
the Oo!l1.mi:ss1on of Enquiry, th e complexity of the situation 
required th e.t a statem en t of' p oliey be m .de. He indi cated 
to the An1be.sso.dor th at the Unlted t .ates had no quarrel w1 th 
Japan's rights i n Manab.m:1.a. nor did it h ve any des:i .re to in-
trude upon the te r-:ms of e. f'iru: 1 nettlement which might be 
made between the t \Yo disputant eou ntries, sg long as that 
settlement did not i~pair -~ri~a:n rights in Chine . Further, 
th.e Secretary :made it p lain that no settlement which had been 
made under mili tary presaur e and. in violation of the Kellogg 
Pact would be r ~cognized. 28 
The note i tsel:f', sent to China and a 11 the slgners 
of ·the ~ ine Power Pact as well s Japen, wss delivered on 
January 7 • although nctually drafted two days Ge.rlier . The 
27 Memor.andum of the 
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of th ,e United States, The Fe.r 
The United States Government 
28 Memorandum of the Secretary of State, January 7, 
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S_timson P·QOtMne; ae th1• , tnmenclouely stgnifie 'e.nt it$p 111 
Amerloaa polio1 1uime t6 'be called., ,11-tatedt · 
W.tth 'the x-ecent ,nilit-ary opet-atioJi,J about 0hlnoho•, the 
1.-at ~•maining . Jdndnistratiye author1t1 fllf: •~ gove.rn~ 
•~nt et the Onlntse lepubl1o in Sotith Karlebvt:il, • ·• l t 
.· e2.1-,te ·ct }l')rior to Sept. - 18th" l9Jl,. baa btttn · cleatN)Jed. 
'l'lle •e ·l'toa• government conti~ue• o·on:t!den\ that ')le 
: · •o:~k ot the r.t.eutral eomtnietd. ·Qn, l"♦C«tatlt .e.utho~tsed: _by . 
· the COUbct11 of tb.e r....ague of Nati ems •111 . tae1.1l•at:e an 
.ul'tlm :ate . aol~tt.on o.f the d1.r-..r.1·culttea :no• &X!atd .ag be-
t•••n Oh1na ·md lapati.. But in !vi•• et th• pre&ent situ ... 
ation end ot 1 ta on . r:lghte a·rul :obllgat!ons . ihe,J'e.t~, . tb• 
Amel'-ican gov~ru•nt .(le;ema it. iio 'be 1 ts duty to a~t-1.ty 
ll>$tb the gove.1'-l'lme.JJt o.:r the t:htnes,e Republl Q and t:b,e · .. 
biperlal Ja.p·sn.ee governmeat that it o~ ·ot a&D.it the 
leg .al!t7 ot en7 mitu ·at.foa .de t'acto not.t _do.tJ · it ln.ttnid to 
l'aoogn1te •n1 t•••tf or egre .eactni ,ntend !fl.le>' between 
theae g·ov.ernm•nte11 ·.or· agtnts thti-e ,:or:. wbit:b. •111flf 1:Qtpe1;i, 
· tke ttteaty d.ghli of the Unitei 1»tate .a ' o,. its cittz,n• 
.in Cl\1na, tne :lu.41.ng tb.,oa·e wh1-oh i►-~late to. th• aova~ .. 
•1pt,-, the · 1n4eJ)&nden."Ce,, or the tei-l'i torial hd • -cbaia• 
iatrsatiV4!t integvitJ o.t th• Re_pu.b11c ot Gh1aa 1 oir to the 
intei-natlona :1 po1tov relative : to Shina, dGJJlllllonly kllewn 
•• the open dool' po"li•YJ _ and that 1 t does not int•n• te ,-
recogn1 i• an7 111tu.atlon t:veaty o.-r agr•••n-t whic:b ••¥ 'be 
brought aboll.t by m•ans conti,arJ to the cove .nMt s and 
obl1 ,gatlons . of th• P·act of Pas-le of .Aug,u,t 27; 1928 so 
,rh1eb: f ·:,,e:aty beth Chi_Da and lspan.t ae -well aa the Vmted 
Sta.te ,e, are par-tiee . '1 . 
T:b.1• ttat.eJnent ot Ame-rt call pol107 r•pl'eaenl$4 the 
•t~ona••t pi-011ouaoe•nt ma.de by an7 aat!tm, out•lde of ~htn•• 
ai:nee the - O:l"ie:ia aad begun in Septeniber. Ohi11s,, eneour ·a.ged 
1>7 the atreagth _ot tbe Am-erioan •tmid and fe :eling tl'nft th• 
tee~e ' s etfoi-t• w♦re heading foi> failure, again began to 
p-.. ea• ror po•1t1v -e p'UttlliYe aetion bJ tbe United ·Stat .es -
againat . lapu. Thct Ohitiese lilop:e·d tna, :mum !\cttion ec>uld b• 
achieved througb a e,onte.:re.nee of' the aigne_.,, cf ~he till• 
Power 'freaty, but 1'he «n1 ted States tel t tb•t aueb a ••v -e 
(S7l 
would ·be fnadv1se.b1e .at th.at time. 30 The St1maen Doctri?le 
i 
obvious th .at · the United St -at-•• was ·not 1et re<ady- to attempt 
aueb. a s:t$llf. Th4 adrltltli.stration •anted to avoid an7 p.oltor 
that mlgbt ••~• war-l .1ke., p-a.rti•\ll~i-l.y td th an elec,t,t&n eem ... 
1ng up en4 alr1ac:ty be~tng _ as 1 t d14 th-e bn,n'b ot · th• blante 
~e~ the tlnenci al eriais • Furthernio••, the di aappQ!nting re-
·&-c tl dn ·ot the EuNP••• powers t ·o the $tlJ¥on Doott'ine tntl:u:"" 
eno-,4 the $tate »ei,axatnl•n:t grt,etly 1'1 1 te tmwi ll!ngnees \♦ go 
-anJ t'tirthei- · than this mode.vate eit♦rtton or 110:ral pnasu._.e • 
. Sec••••l7 &tlmson had , requested ill hitJ n.ett .s E>,t 3&r1U&l'J 1 
that all of' th• a1~n•re e'P 'he Kine Po.-er Paet tire.ft pro-
n.oucem.ents t1m1lar to hie own. ae was o·t th• o.p!nion thats 
a mult:l-iu1tion statell'len't w-ou1d be. tar mare ♦l:feetive then that 
o~ 3ust Qrte powe:r. 11'hel'e-is no que-std..on that '.b.• · was co1-reei 
in bi .a a·seU1'1Pt1oa, wt •lthollgh J'oltJe of' htall•n• powet-a sup ... 
poirt•ti the po!.107, , tne •for po'irette t.l.l consideNa lt too 
'!t]. 
&t!'Qag • .l!-
$t!lllSOJ/l was p ·(it-ti~lat-11 h-epetul thlt th• Br! tieh 
wou14 ~otn lrlm in hl• J)J'IC)no1U1Ceinent end ln the Fe£ ~aste.tn 
0~1,aia etate1J :bhat thel!lt wa:.11 no l"eason to beU ·eve that theT 
L • t -
11ould _not. 1t 'lh.e Labor go,e:mment ot Reme:a7 Ma"Donald ha4 
pa.rtieipat.ed in . aevettal lntem•tional oonterences 1d. th th• 
30 Memorend.wa tJt the . Qhief of the Division of Far 
EaatJei-n Attair• H()rribeok. lanttar,- a. 1932 - n14., 10 
31 $ timsol'li , o:p ... ;ft!; :S •, P • 96 
32 Ii!! . i:>tiJnSon, op, 41t., p., 100 
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tTn1ted St :a.tes 11 and b~th countries had resolved to di .rect . na-
tional policy toward tu1£1111ng the pl _edge or the Pe.ct . o_t 
Pal'it. Even tbou@Jl. JAa~Donald• s goverlUl'ient b.aci been de_£eat _ed 
in o·etobe:r 0,f 1931, . the ~ew co.al1t1.on -governmen _t had given no 
. . 
lnd1cat1on that 1 t intended to .follo• any polioy other thtm 
continuing Wi.1a .oooperat1on. Nevertheless, . when put t-o th• 
tea,t, the new British government opened the door or appease-
ment to Japan and •<>uld not go along with th.• Amer1car1 
polio7 • .33 
Sir John 811tlcn, the head of the British Foreign Ot-
tice, replies to the Amertean i-eque -~t \hat his gove.-nment ac• 
. . .. 
cepted ' Japan's statement of October 13, l93lll that she was 
' 
the o-hampi 011 or the op;e,n door in Chine • Further.more, on l).eoem-
ber 28 the Jap$1 .ea• Premier had re ·a·tate'1 this tact and deolaPed 
that hi country would continue to adhere to the "open doortt 
.. \ ' ,·, 
and would welco•e foreign p.artioi:pation ·end co&pet-ation in 
t •' • I ' 1 
Msnohurian enterpri•es. In view o'E "thee& assertions., the 
British de.clared that they saw no need to address a 'Eorm.al 
note te Japan other then t-o seek oon.firmttt1on of these state• 
mente • .'.3lt-· 
The tond()n T1mea, tn justifying tbe Sri tlsh refusal 
to iesue a statement similar to the Stlmaon Doctrine, referred 
to China •• an unorganiied atate. The Japanes.e quic-kly cap1-
ts1iz&d upon this lltto:ffio1 al viewpoint. In i-epl1 to the note 
33 . . · . Smith, op. _ el t. • P• 2.3S 
J4. The Chargtl in Gr·eat Br! tain to tae Secretary- of 
State. January 9. 19.32 • The Fore1e Relations of . the United 
~tatea, The Fe-r Ea-st• 1931, IlI. 19 · 
-CS9"1 
of -Janu 'arJ 7 j ·the Japanese aaser .ted th-at ·they ste .e.pted, t:tie-
binding· na~'tire ·ot the •Hine Powei, 'Treaty -and the Kellogg Paet 
but d(!nie .d that · their aet10ne violated · these .•siteem~nt~ dUe , 
' • ·: • It ) ' ' . ' • : . : . '} • I • I , . ~ • I I ' . f •, \ ,•; ' ' ' ' 
to the unsettled and o1stt-eoted state ·of. Ohina .whieh had n~t 
. . . 
': { ! . I ' .,. I ., . 
been eonteiu _plate4 by-·. the, ooatr,acting -partie ,a. lhey · f~» 
',, ' ' . . . 
,: ' ••, , / I r 
aeaured · th• U'nlted State& that they . ha .d no ·-territ()~iai a!m,e . 
or ob1ttone in llatl'e:fiuria but reminded -that g:ov~r~tuit that 
the •• ·lfli-e s.no: .,a..ret7 of th ·at re _gion and 1 t& a.ece•slb1l1ty 
' . 
f'o~ gene:ra.1· tr-ade were m$.tters or de&peat 1ntette$t . and exti-a-
ordi.nary im,p.ortan .ce - to the Japanese peopl&~JS 
Desp:i~e th• po-litenesa or the Ja ,pane.ae reply, it was 
still · a notice -to the trni1)ed Stat~s that tb,ey intended to hold 
on to the -gains made in Jfanchur1a .. The J'apaueae p\lblie pl'oved 
' ' 
to be ·v•ey muoh in favor of this stand. On Februar, 20 a 
g•n.•r~l ·e1e ·et,ion wa.e held w1 th thi.a policy et the ,&ove,mment 
. . 
th• primlry • i1sU:e. T-he reault wae an overwhelming Y:l.cto.17 
tor the cal>t,net ud an =endor ,11ement cf 1 ta apputnt de.t1e.nce 
ot the st1m,0n lioetrttte • 36 
Ort.en, the f&1lure of ·Stimson•• pr-onounoe:ment is . attn.,. 
buted to the - l•~k o.f Eur ,opean and part1 t-u1ar17 Bri ti ah auppoa:-t. 
Altheugh it 1• probable that European support would have made 
th• 'lape :aetu, moro cautio\11~, 1t is , doubttu.1 that even W1 till 
this b.aek1ng the American policy of moderate -moPal pressure 
wou14 have. b.•en ·tuccesstu.1 ·e.t thi _s peint. · fh• Jap ,aneee h.ad. 
gone too tar to back down now end would take their chm,.ce of 
.3S Takeuah1, op. cit., P• 371 
36 Ibid., . P• 373 
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euf~ering ~r possible conaeqnencee rather than endure the 
public ~wnil~ation t~at a retreat wou~~ bring. They had 
taste~ both military ,and diplom~tic v:1etory and were now 
I,,; 1 • ' ! , r 
_ -ae .etined to spr&ad the bitter conflict with the Chinese lnto 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SHANGHAI CONF-Lte'? 
There is a tendency to oona,1der the crisi• in 
nchuri a separatelJ from the events which occurred in the 
e1 ty of Sh.engha1 •wly in 1932. The Je.pan~se eentended that 
the two incidents were not related, but it would be ineorr~ct 
to accept t.his poei tion. '!'her were cf reumsta-nc s wh1.eh me.de 
tht Shmghai incident somewhat diffe:t-ent from that in 
Manchuria• but both were _ clashes going on almost s1multe.ne ... 
ously, and both involyed the same disputants. It is difficult 
to believe that Japan would have adopted the aggress _ive policy 
that she did in Shettghai had sh not been ao 1uccesstul, m.111-
t rily ~nd diplomatically, 1n Man·churia . It is logical, ther$-
f'ore, th t this study or American policy , inelud the Shanghai 
incident •Swell ae the Ohinese•Japanese conflict 1n anchuria. 
' hengha1, Ohina , one of the world's largest cities , 
had s&ver 1 unique features in this period. Loeated in the 
mid t of this typically crowded ~d cramped oriental city wae 
probably the mo$t modern and cosmopolitan comnunity in Asia . 
Thie section was known s the I:nternati onal Settlement and was 
inh bited by some ~0 , 000 ritish, Freneh, Am. r1can, and 
Japanese citizens , all busily engaged 1n the thriving commerce 
of this , tb.e economic heart of Ohina . The particularly unusual 
{61) 
,. 
(62) 
feature of the Internation81 Settleme .nt •as the political pri• • 
vileges 1 ts citizens enjoyed. The people of the settlement 
had definite municipal powe-rs for their aeetion, including 
control or- 1te polie-e toree and taxation, entirely separate 
from th .e Chinese gove!'nmen t . or the cl t.y pr,ope r. F\lrthe rm ore; 
in addition ~o the police force, the major nat'ions represented 
in the iettlement eta.ti o.-d troops there to protect their in-
terests. Included in this group were some l, -250 Amerio-an 
u ., . l 
:mar"'nes. 
The b$.sis or the tension that began to build up be• 
tween the 3apanese citizens 1n the Internat1 onsl -ettlernent and 
the Chinese int~ city was the b<>7cott by the latter or Japanese 
goods 1n1 tiated in th♦ aunmn• ot 19.31 sa a weapon designed to 
decrease that nation ·fe exploitation of the area.- This move• 
ment was given treinendous impetus by the Manchurian cr1s1e. 
As already men.t1one4, the boycott Yas a sev ·ere econe:mic- blow 
to Japan. Next to the tJnite4 States, China had been the gt'eat-
eat purchaser or Japanese. gooda, and when the boycott atl'UOk; 
lt 1JR8 natui-&1l7 _felt 8t•ong1y 1n this ' 1ndU8trial and eommer-
2 
ci al cente~. 
The~• · is no questio .n th.at the Chinese wei•e guilty of 
some vio.le ,nce in carl/'7ing out the boycott. CX'nis fact, -cou-
pled with an anti -Nippon pr&as e-•paign over the Man¢hur1an 
c-risie end the large number of Japanese M.ar1nea s-tat1one4 in 
Shanghai, had raised much antagonism against the Chinese in 
2 Ibid., p. 111 
- -
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the Japanese c;p1arter of the settlement. I This resentment 
rett<fued a climax on January 18, 1932, when five Japanese 
ei t1 zens, 1nelud1 ng three monks; were attacked in fpo:nt of a 
Chinese factory. All or the Japanese involve -d in this inci• 
dent were ser1Quely hurt, and one of the monks met his death. 
The ~rapane se pPOteeted that th♦ laxity of the Ohinee-e · police 
in putting down previous demonstrations and minor acts of vio-
lenc-e bad led to this. serious incident , and it was asserted 
that the Chinese government in the cit,- would be held 1\llly 
respon$1ble. The latter immediately denied respond bil1 ty 
and declared 1h at the whole affair had been occaaioned by the 
large number of Japanese . Marin-es stationed in the e1ty . 3 
The ee-Pioua situation crea ,ted by the attack on the 
monks •as magnified two days later when J~panese citizena re• 
taliated by s ·etting · fire tc a Chinese ractoey . This act of 
destruction resulted in a t'lerce clash between the fifty 
Japanese Pesponaible tor it end local police. Se fore the bat -
tling was over • several had been wounded end one combatant on 
each a:t de had been killed . 4 
Tension 1.n the c1 ty now reached a fever pi tcm. On 
January 22 the Japanese $ant a landing forc-e of ,Soo men sup-
po:i-t-ed by one cruiser, one aircraft c-arrier, end t'our d.e• 
atroye ,rs into the area to back the 3,000 troops already eta-
3 Tho Japanese Embassy to the Department of State, 
February 7 • 1932 - The. Foreign Rel$ tions of the United: Sta-te& .1_ Japan, 19,31-1941, I, - 186 
4 The Oonsul General at Shangbai to the Secretary or 
- tate. January 20 • 1932 .. The Foreign Relations of the United 
States., The Far Ee.gt 1 1232, III, 40 
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tioned in the city . 5 Soon after, an additional equadron ot 
twelve 4.eat~oyers joined this force , and the Chinese t~und ,. 
themselves faced with an imposing ehow ot mil:t tary atrength~ 6 
, ', \ , : I ' •, I I , 
Backed by this 1ncreatied military power, t}le ./apanese 
' ' • $ • , 
) 
Consul General 111 Shanghai delivered a set of d~apds to ,.the 
Clhinese Mayor, Wu Tieh. - cheng, on clanua~y 2$. This c~~que 
denumded that • formal apology be del .1vere4 t o t he Japan•e~ 
government, that those 1'eepons1ble for tJle ine .ident of, Jal)u-
. . . 
uy 18 be arrested immedi•tely , that the Chinese pay the hos-
pital bills and ciQagee ot the Japanese 01 tizens 1nvel1'ed , that 
the anti.Japanese movement b$ put unde?' control, and: finally, 
that all organization~ promoting that Jllovement be d!uu,ived . 7 
In Th'O Far Eaat ·ern Cris .is , Se·eretaey Stlmton state a 
that he h&4 h<.)ped that the note of Jamu,r7 7 would have ended 
d.iacu.asion on the Ohineae-Japanese 1asue , but the threat re-
•ult!ag :ri-om the J .apae$e milt te.ry bu1ld.,-up 1.n &hanghai eon-. 
•inced him that he must do m.ore . He •ae awal'e that it' the 
bo7cot .t did not bring J'apan to term.a Qhln& might re• ,ort tQ 
war; and a wer between China and Jap$!i at this time would b~ 
dieastroue to American trade. On the other hand., Oh.ins might 
relegate her11elf to a subservient positJ.on to l'apan, a ad.tuii:• 
5 T'he Ambaa.aador in Japen to th$ Secretary of s.tate, 
January 22, 19.32 • '!ht Fo.:Peign Bele.tio:ns of the tt:nite .4 . Statte, 
The Far Ea.at. 19;2, Ill, 49 
- ; ' 
6 Ibid . , January 27, 1932 , P • 77 
7 The Consul General at Shanghai to the Secre~ary of 
State, Janury 2$, 1(932 .. Th~ Foreign !elations of the United 
States, !he Far East, 19,J?, III , ,58 
I ' i 
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tion the United Stittea would consider equally undesirable. 
The Secretary was also ot the belief that the new thr•at to 
British trade might lead that nation to co()perate on this 
matter, and he called. in the British Ambaae•dor, who agreed 
that some aet1en eh"C>uld be tilken .. Encouraged by' this •tti .. 
tuee, St1:tn.eon .sent a no,te t .o Japan expressing his concern 
over the possible uae of the Interna,ional Settlement aa • 
ba~e for hostile. action against Chi~e and urg~<J that aximwn 
reatra1nt be use«J. , Meanwhile, the American fleet in Hawaii 
to1! maneuvers ••• instweted to remain in that .loeatic:>n in 
an etfert to quiet the te•r . (;)f the ct ti zena ot the Inter-
nat1 on;8J. S•ttlement end ebow the Cb..ineee that the United 
St•te .s was awaPe of' the si tuatton. 8 
.At tlrtt, . the · arralr seemed to o · stX-~ighteJ\lng it-
self out. Upon J'eceiving the Jap•nese d.exnands, · tb& . Chinese 
Mayor of She.ngb.ei informed all pat-ties ooncerned that he in ... 
tended to -~ak:$ all poa-sible eoncf)e _sic-n ·e to . avoid a cla .sh. 9 
A repOPt trom th• Consul General 1n Banking on Janu&l"f 2S 
stated that the Japanese had indicated that the Gh1neee re ply 
was satis.f actoey, qd American of1'1c1a1J 1tl the are .a were. of 
the b-el1ef' that the te:Qe1ons were liftlng end the situation 
could be resolved, lo 
'!'his optimism proved to b.e UWflrranted. Neither the 
8 S"tiw,on, OJb 9it., P• 133 
9 The Report et' the League Assembly, op. cit., P• 41 
lO 'fhe Consul General t Nank1ng to the Seci-etary or 
State; January 25, 1932 - The Fctreign R,elations gf _the United 
States, The Far , Eae,t 1 1932, III, .60 · 
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M.ayor• s reply, the earlier American rtote; nor tbe presence ot 
the United ,s-tates fl~et in the Fae1f1~ area had ehanged the ' 
' : . . . ~ . . . . . . ' . . 
Japanese •tt .itude. The Chinese Peply to tbe Japa~ese ··aemands 
had indicated that uhe forme .r would soeept' the · t!iio'si ~hr•~ · 
, • " , ; f ~ , ' i , ' :~ J I I , \ , I , ' I ·, - , ."-'\ f 
point .e but felt that the fourth, controlling ant[ -... Nipp:on ·t,e .. 
ha•icr 1 would . be 4iitticD. il t . A.fte:r atudyi 'rig thl-$ ~~pl.7 ~ . 
I: ' 
.AdmiPal K.oieh1 Sh10tUt•a , the commem4e~ of' th.$ .Japene,ae . torc.e:,t 
in th-e Q.ity, ise .ued ·~ ,taming tluit uniess a satiste.ctot9Y .replJ 
\ ·, ' . 
' ' I ' ' 
was r-eceeived neQeasary s,eps would be taken to pt-oteet Japanese 
rights and inte ,1t~st11h Dee.pi te · a ~epeat ot the Ottigi:rial Chinese 
aaauranee ·s~ Sh1ot:awtt 1.ssued a second wil.rn1ng on J'amua~)' 27, de-
manding that ell to~.- points be •ctept-ea by ,6::oo :P.M .• the to1-
lold.ng day. 
'fhe . relldtnts of the :tnte.-national -Settle•nt were .now 
, . 
convinced th•t the Japanese militsr-y to.roes we-re setaieue. At 
' i: -O0 P.M .• en lanuiary 28 a meeting c:,f the Mun!elpal Council. 
whi•h 1:il:cl~ded Japanese memb•i-e, ••t held, and a e.ta.te or . &iner• 
geney wa.1 declartd.. UndeJ1· such a eondit ,ion a ;preatt-ruge.a s1s• 
tea or dtfenslve poid. tieu t ·or the area had b~eii organi~ed 
wtth eaeh .of th• netiona P$pr• -sente4 assigned: to • 4ef1n1te. 
, , 
ae .c·tor. With the
1 
situation re-ady to . ••Plede ltt enr minute, the 
Chinese Mayor totinallt agree .ct at lpOO i>.». te meet the Jap$nese 
dem.end-e c-ompletely. An 1n:uied1ate ptlblie prono .u.neement ·by the 
Japanese Qona\11 Oetie· .. 41 ternted the X'ep1:y s·at1staetoP-y 1 and 1t 
appeared ·a ¢lash herd been av♦ided+ 
The nlief of the people of the eett .le.m•nt We.$ an-ort 
lived, howev·er, when •soon af'ter ndcln1ght there came the sound 
of gunflt"e :tro:tn the Chin.ea~ 41strtct ,of Chapei. Although. 1 t 
(6 .7) 
would seem unneeessarj under the circumstanoea, .tapenese 
forces, after giving the ·.Chinese of't'ic _1s.la onl.1 thi:rt :7 minutes 
notice, had . begun to move into the tr aasi$ned defensive s c_tor 
• ! ' • 
. ' 
e.t 11 :q.$ P . • ?ert o:f the . Japanese see~oi- was loeated just 
' 
outsin• the settlement •area in tne di st:riet ot Chape1. · Chinese 
tro0ps in that ~e -a, Whont tbe cit, oft1c1~1• had _ not had time 
to inform ot the Jap .anes• 1nten ·t1on. took the mov.e as en at• 
te.ek md opened tire. Imrned!ately the Japanea.e returned the 
fire., end the elaeh wb! ch the Chines.e la.ad atiwived -so hard to 
avoid hed nsppel/iled. 
As eoon ee he had received th9 newe or the fighting, 
Admiral Shi -oz:awa sent the entire comploment o-t' Japanee• troo'pa 
into the battle and at 4:00 A.M. ordered the planes at hie dis .. 
posal to bomb Chap el. Sy tn1~ise the entire qµapte:r was in 
flames ft-om inoend1ar.y bombs, hundreds of eivi. .lians had met 
their death, md an estimated . 2.S0·,000 refugee,s we1!'e pouring 
into the Inter national Set,1ement.l 1 
f'he bombi11g o~ ct t1ee beta.me eommonplac• 1?l World War 
It. but in 1931 the unwarranted killing of women and children 
aa well as of Jlilitaey personnel cane as a: severe eb.oek. Pub ... 
lie opinion 1n the United Sta'tes h.ad been mixed and 1-t1 some 
cases cU.a1nte -res .t$d in th• anch~lan ctt!s1ei but this e.tl'oeity 
1n. Shanghai .-eaulted in almost univera .al c-oncern. Oond•nnna.tion 
ot the .Japanese •es sevex-e. On Febru&P,y 2 the Philadelphia 
Iilqu!~ -er expres:sed the feeling at the .Amerl.c;en people when 1 t 
etated: "Thf> bon:,.bing of i-eaidential sections, the murder ot 
(68) 
h~lpless men, -w-omen and children puts J '$.pan beyond the pale ot 
civilized w-arfare.ul2 -Even more voeiferous was the New York 
DtailY ~1~ro1 . which d•cl&red that th• •Ai-roganee and ru.thlesa-
ness ehai>acterizing the Japanese naval d se,ent on $hangb.M. 
ought not · to sull"pri se · anybody. Humble and cona,ili ate:ty when 
t he bayonet 1s at his own belly., this . y.e!io dwarf, pretending 
?'ecogni tion o.f civ iliz d u.eag , gives no qu rter and shews .nQ 
mercy in a contraFy $ituation.nl3 
At th -e r ·equest of the B~1t11!h G.ovei-illllent, whieh as 
px,ev1ously mention d took a much di ffer ·ent vie ot the Shanghai 
aftli:r from that ot lia.nehurie., the Vntted $tate$ Bent tt joittt 
prote t to Japan. Als , oth the B-riti ... h _ d Ameriea n fleets 
in the P eifie were sent to the imm.•diate .te-en~ cf the ¢ontlfet 
as a means or- eh.o ing the concern of tho-s• nations. SecretS.J'J' 
Stimson always eons.idtred this move na being instrum ntel in 
averting an all out war.14 SUeh en a.st;erti~n. however, is 
qu.eation:abl~ and open to speculation, Cepta1n1y nc evidence, 
other than Stimson' a ord, substantiate$ this pos1 tion. 
An 1l'fl1'llediate 4iseuee1on wes also held between StimsoJ:1 
and the Japanese Aml:,essador. fhe latter eonvey.ed the explana• 
tion of the atteok give -n by his country• s Consul General ih 
Shanghai, who maintained that previo~s t.en::,ione had thrown the 
eity into e t'Nnsy. nd the foree-s had gQne ou'b into the Chapei 
12 
,Upp r and MeReynolda, o:p, oit., P• )22 
lj tgid, -; PP• 320 • 21 
14 ~H'1mse>n, oo, cit.,; P• }40 
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district to protect the lives cf Japanese eitt~ene in the 
area~ ) Upon entering the seetor,, _ the Japanese troeps we.re 
fired upon,, . end the subsequent attack was simply aelf~d•.fense~ 
The .Ambassador the ,n pr-omised that as soot! $$ the Chinese 
f-c,~ce, 1tithdrew ft-om. the area the issue w·o\lld be ·&ettled ;~ 
SJimson by this time was not reeeptiv~ te any fur.the~ 
Japane ·8e olaims fl>f ,self.,. ,defens e~ •~ inf armed the Ai¥lDassador 
tn:at · _tt inade no diff'erenee if the Chinese nad tired th .e first 
shot. By bringing a -.trong naval force 'into ,Shanghai and 
t~reattln.ing . a landing :, Japan had Cl"eated an explosive powder 
keg,, . md it was 1mmat.e.rJ;al who app>l1e4 the ma,teh. 15 ' In Tb:e 
Fa~ ,E.aat1rn C~iaia ., Stimson defends th~s v1ew:point by s:t-ating 
th~t t~ct- move eomi.ng at night in . ae~ ':Vecy and with · little wa::rn-
1ng indicate ·d the Japanese were tni~ to meke it look as 
tboufYi th .e Chinese had started th• clash ·• . The Secretary states 
. ' . ' 
ithe League e.f .Nations stepped into the pletur& on Janu -
ary 3.0 .witll the ,appointment by th 'e Council ot an · .inv-estigating 
commission,. BJ-th"- Ooun(Jil r.eaoluti:on of De-cemJ:>e:r 10, the 
L.~ague had cH,mmi:tte,d -itm&l.t to an investigation _bet'ere pa :esirig 
judgment., _ and it would place itself :1n en e111barra:esing pos ·1-
ti~n ijt it .follo~ed any 0th.el' course here.17 ~ueh a proee•• 
l$ Memo:ranctwn &f ·the SecretBJ-y- of State, Januarr 30, 
1 · . • he . Fore $t1ons .of the 'Un ted · St~tes , . Ja an 
l 1, I ♦ l 
16 Stimson ; op. cit., p~ 123 
17 The RejJot;t of the League Assembly , op. eit., P• 8 
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woa~d -u,ndou~t,edly be ~im~•consuming, and evevyon~ involved 
wanted to l)r1:ng 4:beut a solutien as ,soon ~s pose1t?le. Oonse~ 
q_u.entlr ,. the •Te$ ~t' the world began to turn t '.O 'the:-U'nt'ted. ' -
~b.lie ,optnitn 1-n 'lapan 11$;8 not neai-l.1 as strong 1n 
its . auppoitti of ~ll$ miltt•~• s action in Shanghai as ·lt had . 
be,·en · lJl :regaxiid .t'° the Man~11r1en atra¢Ii• Many J~pmieee• tel1; 
~at the Sltenghe.t fec1den.t had unta•o•~bly .aff&Qttd: . thet:, 
estancitng in •o .rl.d pub~14 opinion. Wb~rea~ th ·ey te;t.t that th•y 
.. 
had pPi:n')lll7 in'b$l'O!lt8 in l4-.nebu~ia,. Othtllt° P·~•-i's had hite~e•t• 
$u•-t •• gi-eat, 1; not g.••ater. in $hafl~a1.18 tn view et t~is, 
a true:-e propiu;,ed bT tht Bt'it1 ,h anti Amer1oan e,on&ttls was .ae • 
eepte& a\ ;8.:GQ t.1:. on 1·.-iauary 29 . •fhe 'f•ilowi~ de.7 the 
japaneae · ought ,h.e ·go-od otfiee .a 0.t the Wtd.teci Statee,. chai-ging 
that Ohinea-e tr&op'a )lQ.d 1"1re4 upon the1n the moi-ning at ·t•~ the 
t~~~· was ac1eepted$' and tb4t Chiang ltai-..e;hek •~• -e,onc•n:t~ating 
i-•1ntot-eements ·t• la:nktng. The Japanese l'•tuested that the 
l.fn1 te.d:· Sta tee utt, 1 tJ 1at'luenoe to p~~~•nt tne Qh!fs\eae rrom 
tending t"ein.toreemente . t,0 Shanghai '$1\<l to pe~$U.ad• them te 
td. thdraw theil' . \~ooptt . al~eady 1:r,, the ti t7 in oi-ae+. to avoie 
furthe:tf elll'.sheil. 19 
It e.ppea~a that th~ Japanese 'had ~ee.11••4 tb&1' haa 
m:ad$ a e-,v.e_.e m1•ta'1te in provoking th.ls 1ti:~tdent. !hey had . 
&tt .e.eked '$hatigha1 with t;o(') small a toPtG an4 when seemingly 
f71) 
rep.ulaed had · ret .orted to en at:roei ty, fh.e bombing of Chapa!; 
which eho~ked the civlliged world. It was apparent t~st they 
new w1 $he-d tc, get out ot th.e si tuetiO.fl with_ as 11 'itle emba~- , 
rassment · •es possible and •e:re hope:tul that if the trn1 te-d Sta tea 
accepted the request for good offices J. t might result in • 
sat1s.faetory eolutien. 
Th.e United States did aecept and b&gan to work out a 
8ettlement. , The Amef'i·cu-.n efforts 1'fl"e nearly deat~oyed oia 
February 1. however, when Japan$Je plane,, euppottedly on a 
reoonnai sanee mission ; bombed the eit1 of NfUUling. The bomb., 
tng of this eity; lotated t•o hundred m.fle . up tlte Yan.tie 
JU•e~ trom $hangha1 and the aoen• ef a Chinese troop C¢ncen.., 
trati on, !ndicated that the J'ap,an•se in.,,11 tary otficera ill the 
area wei-e extremely irtteaponslble, and a satisfactory aol.ution 
would not b.e eaeily ae'.aieved. 28 
Se~retary Stlln1u>n tmmediate\1 cal.led in the Japaneae 
Ambasaador again and demanded sueh ewarrent.ed operations &:a 
the bonibing ot Nanking be $'topped. B-e as, .ert-ecl that :Lf they 
we:re not stopped the Japen .ese ooU:ld not expect any satisf'ae• 
tory reault& from the Ameriean good of£.1cee. The Amba,;se:dor 
e.Jq>reeeed. his deep regret ov$r the ine1den t and pl.a~ea the 
blame upon .1l""respon-s1ble of:fic•rs. At this point Stim,son 
tlecicled net to press tht issue any .tUJtther and oftere .d the 
.AmeP1.ean prt)pQse.l for a settlement. 21 
io $tint&on. op. qi t., PP·~ 144-46 
21 Memorandum 0£ the S.ecreta17 ef State; February 1, 
The Forei n .Relations . of the United S -ajtes 111 an, 
,;:;....--=-~;;;a;,;..lt :t, 173 
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The A:meriean propo -aal, pPesentEJd with sone misgivings 
after the bombing of Nanldng, e(?n-sisted of the .following five 
points: 
1. A cessation of all act of' violence by both parties. 
2 . A halt in mobilization nd reparation tor h.oetil1-
J. A w1 thd~aw:al by both sides fro a.ll points oi' m,atual 
contact in Shanghai '" 
4. The creation of' a neutral zone, policed by neutral 
troops, t .o divide the combatants. 
5. Upon acceptance of theee eondition11, J&:pefil and China 
would promptly proceed to settle all out standing 
controversies in the spirit or tho Pact of Parts and 
the Deeember 10 resolution ot the League.2 2 
The day after the Japanese r&eeived the American pro-
posal , Anibas$ador Forbe s talked with :Fo:t-eign ?U.niete.r Yoeh1t••• 
and re:ported th$t the latter was willing to go along with the 
1'1rst tour points -, but the fifth, Which <)'bvioualy rere:rPed to 
.Menchur:U1, we.a considered. comple tel1 unrelated lind unaeceptab1e. 
The Minist.;r hoped• howet'el', that the tfnited States would eon-
eider Jepan•s •cQ•ptance of the fi'r1t .r-ou, points As satis• 
f$Ctol'J'. 23 Secret•ey Stimson repl19d that the United St .ates 
would go along w 1th. e: settlement b&'3ed upon the first .tour 
22 The Sec reta:ry ot State to - the Amb$$·sador ln Japan, 
Feb:rqary 1, 19 2 - The Fomian Re lations of the United .S_ta.te;, 
Je a.n .. l 1 ... 1 11 I, 174 · · 
23 Tile. A.mhatsftdor in Japan to the Secretary of State , 
Februar1 2. 1932 ... Ibid.• · I; 175 
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points if Japan would agree to cons·ider and not reject the 
tiftb. 24. 
While the Japanese Government was seeking the goo~ 
otr.toee of the United Sta .t ·e ·s, tb,e m111 tary waa J)l'epering tor 
. . ' . . 
$ possible -r~swnptlon ot hestilitie•• Secretary Sti mson was 
I 
· eoneei-ne<i througb -0ut the preparation of the five · point pro -
posa l t-hat the Japanese, despite theil' evowe-d good intent .ions, . 
woul.,d not aoeept any .•olution that was no~ a Chinese l'et-reat 
or hwn!liation end a Japanese vieton. Stiason 1 s willingne$s 
to mcd!ty but nQt e11-m1n$te the tttth point 4'-d not constitute 
neh a victory• an~ oa PebN&ry 4-the Japene se :formally ;i,e .. 
j•ct•d the Altlerican proposal and resum~d ti. host111ttea. 25 
Foreign M1n1a\•l" Yoshiz&wa im'ormed Ambas1u1dor Forbes 
that the Japan••• would not have renewe, the fighting 1r as• 
eured that the Chinese would have ceased hoet11i ties, but due 
tio the unreliability ()f tbe Chinese 1n the · paet thie was not 
poestble . lurtib.e~more, the Amettieai p.POpoaal ~ad to be re-
jected on the bseia o.f the ti.fth point since it waa settled 
Japanese policy not to . accept e.ny neutral pffti e1pat1on 1ft a 
eettle.nent of the »snehur1an queation. 26 the Japanese turther 
a1'tempted to Justity the rejeet1ott of the Amet-1c,an piaopese.J. in 
e fol'JfUll cmmnun~qi.u, to the State Depar't~t . This statement 
24 Memorandum or the Se cretaPy of State , February 2, 
1932 ... Ibid*, I, 176•77 · 
2S Stimson, op • . e!t., P• 1.,0 
a4 The Ambassador in J'apan to the Secretary o·r State, 
·Februaey 4. , 1·,,32 .. T.he· Fore1 ,gn Rel~t1ons <>t "tl\e United States 1 
Jap~n, 1931-1941, I, 1ao~S2 
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eharged th~t the Chinese had fired upon Japanes troops after 
the ·tm1ce had been ac .cepted, . had continued to build up rein-
.foreement-s, end were responsible for the whole incid-ent in the 
first place.. The J&panese .felt, the 'statement continued, that 
th~y cou.ld aecttpt no s.o-lution which did net plse~ oomple-te 
blame upon Ohina . 27 
The 3apanete h~d now eomm.1 tted themselves openly ·to a-n" 
l:lggre&sive policy in Sbanghai. A. Reutezts News Agency ' report 
ot Febru&r7 8 declared the .t the Japanese Foreign Office rlO 
longe ·r gave even lip service to tne . ine Power Tr aty $nd now · 
t'avoJi:ed the scrapping ot the Open Door am e return to the old 
policy of dismemberment. '?his eonvinced Seoretar-7 Stimson 
that it would be futile . to attempt to reaaon with tb.e JepaDese 
any futtther. From this point on, American . policy in Shanghai 
was designed. to proteet 'the 1n.ter.eets 0-t her e1t1>tene. living 
there. 28 
1ht"Oughout the conflict, the Intei:-nat1 onal Settlemen t 
was in great tear ror 1 ts safety. Its citizens were also 
deeply coneerned over the possibility of incidents which might 
bring the United States and the Brit1.sh 1ni0 tb.e conf11et. In 
an effort to pr vent auoh a situation, the United States per .. 
&uaded the JapaneBe, with eons-idei'able dlt-t .1eul ty, to stop us• 
ing the settlement what' tor landing troops. Even more dangerous 
wa s the tact that the lapenes-e oi'ten moved troop~ th~o• the 
American sector, end there was always the possibility of a 
27 . · The Japanes~ Em.bas&J. to . tho Department of State , 
February 7, 1932 • IbJd., PP• 186-88 · 
28 Stimson , op. cit., P• 1S9 
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clash with marines stationed there . After (.lonsid$rable et-
tort on the part of American officials., this pra .ct1ee was 
also halted. 29 This represented the extent of American nego• 
tiatione i h.oweveJ". Stimson sent a note to Ambessador Forbes 
ordering him t-0 meke no iurther e.f.fort at conciliations since 
it would only result in another rebuff and hmniliation for 
the United States .30 American faith in Japants sincerity was 
now eompletel7 shattered, and as the .fighting in Shanghai eon• 
tinued, the State Department began to consider stronger ac-
tion. 
29 . emorandum or the Se cretary of State, Fi bru.ary 15, 
1932 - The i.'ore.1fn Relati .ons ·of th,e· United Sta,te , Jaean, 
1931·12lil, I, 19 
30 The Secretary of tate to the Alli, asssdol- in Japen,. 
February 10, 19.32 ... lbid. • . p. 191 
CHAPTER V
THE DEVELOP N'f OF COMMON POLICt 
The developments in Shanghai convinced · ecretary 
Stimson that some e.ddi t1onel step nmat be taken to help tbe 
merican people better understand their eountry•s policy and 
to bolster the morale of the Chinese, who were becoming dis-
couraged by the lack of aid and the failure of the world 
powers to take a positive stand.1 
Stimson felt acme definite restatement ot policy was 
neces$ary and hoped 1 t could be accomplished jointly b1 the 
eigners of the Nine P.owet- Treaty. FroJn the beginning, Stimson 
had considered the Nine Power Treaty a much mor-e appropriate 
basis for juagment on the question then either the Kellogg 
Paet or the League Covenant, because it did not deal in 
generalities and epe ,cit'ically referred tc China. 2 I t had been 
at Preaident Hoover• s auggestion that initially an attempt 
wes made to invoke · the Kellogg Paet., Now1 however. the magni• 
tude o:f tbe a1 tuatiotl and the failure of pre'f'ious e.ff:orte c·om-
pelled the ecretary to return to hie Ol'iginal approsc-h . 
Two important factors determined the United States' 
l Stimson , op, cit., p . 98 
2 Memorandum of the Secretary of State, February 18, 
1932 - 'the Foreign 1lelationa o:f th~ United States I The_ Far 
East, 1932, III, 373 
(76) 
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d~c1sion to make a further posi t1ve stat 'ement at this peint. 
First. the round table eonference at Shengh.ai, which had been 
initiated by the League after the resumption o.f hoe t!l ities, 
was showing d&finite signs of b-reilking dewn . , The United 
Stat_e ,a had re.fused to take part 1n this cenfer&nce eince- · the 
S.ecr•t a:ry of Stat. no• longer had any faith in Japan• s sin• 
' ' 
cer1ty. Alao, the . Seepetar-y feared outside powers .might ll\Se 
the meeting t .o· fo,:-ce a settlement of many t1.e worn griev. 
ancea wH'h Chiu due to the 1ntern ·at1onal. eharaetei- •t 
' . ' ' 3 Shanghai . 
l>esp1te this attitude,. it is evident that Stims<;,n 
,, 
seerotly hoped the conference m1gb. t be succesetul in solving 
the Shanghai que1tion. :tn a 111emorandum of F&bi-uat-y 18, he 
stated that one of the reasens be had he14 off m&ldng a pro ... 
nouneem.ent 1uus the - t'aet that the oonfer~nc e had looked a.o en• 
eo~rag1:ng. 4 YU thin a few hour a atte~ Stimson had prepared 
. ' 
thie •emoi,umm, a comm1ua1que was .-eceived from the M1n1ster 
1n China, Jlel ton Johnion, whieh 1:ndic ·ated tba t th• oonferenc• 
wae break;lng tio1Jn e.nd an7 hope tor a •·ettlement from thet 
eour():• ••• futile .. S 
Th$ other factor 1ntlu-en,.ing the Sec:rela;ry 1 s d.eciaion 
wa21 the eJlleati e>n of the state o t Jlanebu.kuo . As pr .evi oualy 
3 s· ti · · · "t 180 · me on, oa. o~ . • , p • 
• - ; ' < -
q. M.emoi"mdum ot the Secretary or State, February .18• 
19.3Z - 'l'be .Pere1gn .Re.la .ti~na of the Ulil1 ted states, . 'l'he Par 
Ea-st, 19.J2,. ?II, 313 . . 
S The Minister in China to the Secretary of ste.te, 
F'ebl'l:lat-y 18, 193! :.., Ibid., P• 313 
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mentioned, the Japanese had taken the first step in the or-
geni~et1on of a new ate .te in Manchuria on October 31. 19~1. 
The Japaneae Conti nu.:ally :referred to these efforts ts ~11). in-
dependent move:r.i.mnt or the peop l e of 14anchu-n s 1 but sever•l 
reports had reached the State Departmel!lt 1t1d!ca ting the 
Japanese were responsible £or the move@ttt nd were . e>emple\el.7 
behind ' it. 6 
On Febru~l'7 18, the same day . Stim .son rec ·eived w°'rd of 
the probable b,r&akdown of ·the Shenghl1 Conference; • the local 
governments of MeJ!le.huria. joined t(:)gethel" ta what was called 
the All Manehurian Organization and declared their in.depend - · 
ence from China. !fhe following day the new organization de• 
cided to fo-rm a repul).;lic ·. '!'he new state was to be known as 
Manchukuo, and the heir to the old Man~bu dynasty, Henry Pu Yi, 
long since liv!ng under .1apanese p~otection; was invited to 
become th-e ohiet executive.7 
Stimaon•s hope waa to promote a 301nt pronouncement 
of the signers ot tb.& line Power T;re,aty against both the 
Shanghai attack and the cl"eatien of the new state . The Secre .. 
tary was part1c:uleirl1 anxious to obtain British froopention, 
just as he had been when he delivet-ed the note or Je:nuapy. 7. 
0 
'fhe Ambas,aador in Japan te the SeeJ'etary of State, 
Jenu.an le,_ ~?2. • 'l'h_e Foreign RelatiQns Of the lil_ni ted St _ates,a 
~J.a:em, 1931- 12!1:l, t, f8 
The Minis tar in China to the Se.cretary of State , 
October 2, 1931 ~- The F:orei~n Jtelations of the United ~tatea .1 
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'Phere was now reason to believe the Br1 t .i sh ~eac~i on would 
not be .~e . same e.s it had been at the tin:$ of the pUblica~ 
tion of the St11t_1eon D,oe_triJ?:•• due to the w11:;t.1ng~e~~ ,or th~t 
' I ,, ' '••• 
country to cooperate when the Shanghai eitua~ion had fir~t 
Thia assumption did not prove t.o be correct, how-
. .. ·, 
ever, since the British were members of the League and were 
. . . ' ,' 
extremely reluctant to take any otion while the q~e ti -o-n was 
atill under consideration by that 'bOdf. After nuni.erous tele• 
phone eonversatione with Sir John Si~on, the head of the 
British Foreign 0£f1ce, Sti mson decided not to press the issue 
any further, It waa evident that it the United States wished 
to take action at this p,oint, 1t must do eo alone. 8 
The problem now was to det-erm!ne what .form the ~rican 
action should take. A direct note, ahnilar to the on& of 
January 7., would probably only lead to another rebuff. Co~se-
quent ly, Secretary Stimson decided to use an old policy of 
Theodo,.e Roos-evel t, the. writing of .&n open letter. Such e 
eourae would make it possible to g-et oft an announcement wtth-
out centradiQtion or discussion. Furtner ·.., it would not be 
weakened before being published by tbe . expressed doubts of in-
fluentiel. people .9 
It was decided to . write this. open l$tter to Senator 
Willian Borah. , the ebalrman or the Senate Foreign Relationa 
Committee. Sen, it,&P ,Borah was an ideal addressee due to his 
prominent position end d.ue to the known !'e.ct he was anti• 
8 Bisson , op, _91 t., p. 2.3 
9 6 Stimson, op. cit ., p. 1 ° 5 
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Japanese. At the time of the Muk~en incident the Senator waa 
-q_uoted as e:yi.ng, "Even though the Japan se rea-sons were ten 
times as tmthful as it can be asswned .the7 are, there is no 
nlO just1~icat1on for force 1n Manchuria. tt • • 
The b sis of the letter was to be the N1ne Power 
Treaty, which, as has been said, was favored by Stimson be-
cau · e of it s sp cifio refer nee to Chin. The letter wae to 
be directed to five unnamed addresse~s. It a to serve as a 
message of encouragement to China, an explan tion of pol1c'1 
to the Amer1e n publ!e, a suggestion of future possible ac-
tion to the eountri e$ mo would be assembled at t . e next 
meeting of the League of Na.ti one• end a gentle r-..minder to 
the Bri tlsh th t they were co-e .uthot>s with tb.e Un1.te St tes 
of the Open Door Policy nd the Nine Power Paet. Fin ally, the 
letter we. to eerv El.fl rem.in d r to J' a.pan th t if '5h e chose 
· t ·o break down one of the treaties a reed up-on t the W ehington 
Conference, certain ri.ations might see fit te reltla$e th m-
selves from other as vit al to Je.p n as the- N1.ne Power Treaty 
w s to them. 11 
Thus, with the belief the.t Em open letter would be as 
eff'ecttve to the five ddres ees as dir et note, yet would 
not beer as many dangers, Secret ry Stim.ffcn publi ed. the let.-
ter to Senator Borah on February 2:;, 1932. The length of the 
letter preclude its . being quoted here, but th import of it 
does merit a rather extensive awnmery. 
lO Tupper and McReynolds, op. c~t.; p. · 297 
11 
Stimson, op 1 cit., P• 175 
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The letter began by · reaffim ing the Open Door Policy 
in Ghins .. It th,n went on t some length to explain the ine 
Power Treaty• which the Secretary · stated, assured all inter-
esta ·d powers their rights in China while also as-suring the 
Chinese people . the right to develop unmolested their sove:r ... 
eignty- and · independence. 
Stimson cont.inuad by declaring tbs. t Japan was a defi -
n1 te supporter of thi&;s tx-eaty at .the time it was signed. He. 
ubstantiated th;t s assortion by quoting .Baron Shidehar , ho 
said at th -at tilll&, nNo one deni~s to China h.er · sacred right 
to govem herself.. No one . stand.a in the way ot China to work 
out her own national destiny. 1112 Stimson went on to s.e.y that 
six years la ,ter the provisions of t-he Nine Power '?reety re-
ceived powerful t>einforcement w1 th the signing of th Kellogg 
Pact, llhieh also included Japan among. its signers. 
Now dealing witp the sit~ation in 1uestion, the letter 
stated that the hoetilities in Mench~ia and l ater Bhangbe i 
had brought home the vital .importance of faithful observance 
of both the Nine Power- Tretty and the Kellogg Pact by all na-
tions 1nter&$ted in the Far East . It aaser'ted that the 
United States .felt that if the powers had stuck tQ the p:rinci-
ples advocated by these -covenant&, no matter where blame may 
lie, the hostilities in Manchuria end Shanghai never would 
. . 
have developed. Also, complienee w.ith these eovenants would . 
not have interfered with the legitime :\ie :rights or any or the 
treaty signers. 
12 Ibid., p. 170 
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It eont1nued with a stat•ment of the note of January 
7 • which sdv1sed China end Japan that the United States would 
re-eogn1ie no &greement reached by those nations that viol~t•4 
the 1nterna.t1ons.l treat .1es. It asserted that this wa ... still 
the policy of the United State and urged that the other na ... 
tiont of the world adopt a similar etand.~ 13 
Finally, Stimflon concluded the letter by stating of 
the United States: 
We conev--r w1 th those statesmen, repre enting 
all nation in the 1a hington Con!'e~enoe, who declared 
that China: a · entitled to the time necessary to accom-
plish her . development. ~ e1 are prepared to make that 
our polioy of the tuture.JJ+ 
Thue, the United ts.tea bad reaftirmed its 1ntent1on 
not to recognize any gains of Japan aeeomplished through vi o-
lati ns of the intern.ation 1 peace treaties and, _ although not 
directly condemning Japen•s action, had brought moral pre -
sure upon that country-. Public op1ti1o• in tne United ·tates 
wae ve.,,-7 much behind th1 poliey. tead1ng newspe.pers th~ttgh ... 
out the country hailed the letter to Senator Se.rah as a 'fit• 
ting rejoind r to Jap n•s tU'gutn nt aeeking to juaStify the 
operations in anchuria end Sh nghai; they were almost unan1-
moua in ur-ging the support of the • i-tc an pe epl..e. l$ Furth.et'• 
mor,e, th1.s policy was not regarded a coldly by the Euitop~an 
powers · s was t e Stim son Doetri ne, a.nd 1 t became the guide 
13 6ti'n1son, 02. cit. , The Letter to Senator t>orah 1a 
round on page 166-75 
14 Stimson, op. cit., p. 175 
15 
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post for their impending action . 
In the meantime China had made a second appeal to 
the Lee.gue of Net1Gna at the outset or the host1lit1Efe 1n 
Sh8nghai, this t1me under Article XV. of the League -Covenan.t. 
As previously mentioned, a conference had been set up to con-
duct m 1nvest1gat1on and s-eek e. solution. On February 2, 
during the early truoa, this group had declared that the in-
cident wee a de .finite state or war in everything eJtcept offi-
cial name. Beyond this declaration, however, the C'Onference 
showed little sign of ?)ringing about a $Oiution atte:r hostill• 
ties had been resUJ'il:ed. The Japanese attaoke were 1nereaeing 
1,n magnitude each tay, and, becoming des perate; the Chinese 
decided to invoke the prov1eion of .Article XV whioh permits 
the Council to reter a dispute to the League Assembly. This 
dec1e1on • s predicated upon the belief that the smaller 
powere or the world, which had eonaiderably more influence in 
the Assembly thm in the Oounci 1, would be more sympat-hetic 
to the cause of a victim of aggreeeion than would the gPe•t 
power:a, Atter a vigoroue debate,. the Council acceded to 
China* s reque t, and the issue 1n1e referred to the Assembl7 
on Februal'J 18. 
Meanwhile, it was obvious that Jlpan b d undereati• 
mated the Chine &e in Shanghai. For a.l.mos t a inonth they con -
tinued to attac~ the Chinese posi t1one r-rontally with onlJ 
moderat• suecees. It wa.s not until the last days of February 
thst the Japaneee gave up the trontal attacks and flanked 
the Ohine se poei t1 ons by a movement up the Whangpu JU.Ver. 
(84) 
This move gave the Japanese the upper hand, and on February 
26 they decided to seek en end to the fighting. The heroic 
resistance of the Chinese and tbe adverae effect the opera.-
, 
tion h$d had upon world public opinion left the Japanese in 
a difficult posi tion • . lfew that their fo:Peem had gained the 
advantage, th~7 were anxious to get out ot an embarrassing 
ei tiuit!on ea quiokly ae· possible • .16 
On Feb:N .ary 29 the Council of the League of Nationa , 
acting up-on Japants r-equest., prop osed a eeesa.tion of the 
Shanghai . ,fighting. 1-'he p.owers represented in Sliangb.ai ••re 
instructed to si .t down at another round table confe~enee with 
China and Japan to conclude arrangements to make t.he ceas ·ation 
of: hostilitie .e definite. and the withdrawal of.' the Japan eae 
troops complete. 17 The United Stetee was invited to join 
this eQnferene$ also, but on.c-e again Stimson refus .&d. Re 
1mmed1 tely sent word to the Con•ul Oetieral in hangha1 in-
etrtieting him defln.1tely not to particip ·e.te. 18 The United 
Stat-es waa 'a till. smarting from the Japanearn rejection or- h.er 
good o£fi cea, and, as h s already been etated,. Secretary 
Stiineon bad eompletelf lost faith in the tntent1ona of the 
Japanese to s.e k a peaceful and. just solution. This feeling 
was heightened bJ the taet that although Jap•n had requeet .ed 
16 T'akeachi., op. :eit., pp . 376 ... 78 
17 
'Bhe Deport of the League Assembly, op._ cit.,. P• 44 
d li Tbe Sec-retary ot State to the Consul Gener n 
Shanghai, · arc:h 3, 19.32 .. ~he, fo.reign Relations of the Uni tecl 
State,, Japan, 1931-1.941, I, 201 
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the February 29 proposal for a cessation of hostilities, she 
launch~d the heavieat attaeks of the campaign on March 2 and 
March J. This move WU ' ~esigned to leave the Japanese in a 
position of mil1t .ary •~vat1tage and convinced Stimson that the 
:•11. 
United State$ $hould JJ.ave no p rt in the cont'ere-nce .. 19 
T1:te armistice~ -signed on march · $,: provided fen- an end 
. ' . ~ ' . 
to the fignting, a return of e.l.l troo-pe to the pos1 tions occu-
pied before January 26, and the suJH)rv-ision .ot this with ... 
drewal by the natione represented ·et .the ecnfe!'ellee. 20 Thus, 
the conr'lict at Shanghai came to 8fl , end 111th tew. .,$1gnifieent 
' 1 •· ~;, I 
;,' I 
result • t,os ee in the f igh ting had · b_$e:rf e.:tt:reme 11"• heavy• , 
The, casue.ltJ.ea numb~:red . .$,000 Chine~e and 1.500 · 'Jtlp . n.es& mil!• 
tary per ·sonnel ·· s \Yell aa 8.000 e1v1l:fen.s. lso~ ' oonsiderable 
damage had · been inflteted upon the e i\y~ _p~tieularly in the 
dist1rict ot Chapel . Js.pant .s only gein ws · tbat the Chinese 
did lessen · the boyeo~t fol.lo ing the armistice. Unli ke 
Man¢hur1a, the Japen -ese bad voluntarily .given up · thel:r mili-
tary gains because they did not have tb.e public support ~t 
home in this inci4•l'lt ~s they had had in the Manahul"ian ques-
tion. Chine., on the ot4tr hand, -had gaine4 mueh in a l'eb!rth 
o~ national pride in her heroic Neistanee. Xn ~he Far Eastern 
Cris! Sec;retary Stimson m intains that the only really 1gni• 
.ficsnt result of the c.on.flict wa that it tn de pl in. ev n 
19 e orand:mn of the Secretary of State, areh 3. 
19.32 ... I'bia ., PP• 2os-201 
20 Agr•e-ment - Coneerniqg the Definitive Cessaticm of' 
Rost111t1.es at Shangb.~1, arch S, 1932 • !bid., p • 217-16 
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more than had · anehuria , the true ext$nt and character of 
.lap .an-ts policies. 21 
While · the Sh'angh$1 incident wa,s being brought ~o --• 
conciu:.sion, the Japaneee :were· busily solidifying their posi-
tion 'in . ·~mchurle.. On March l the etate of Manehuku.o was 
of:f'icially .formed . · ~e following day the State Departmen t l"e"" 
eeive-d a eommunication tl'om • B'sieh•Ohieb•shih, the Foreign 
' ' 
- Min,iste~ of the new stat .a, explaining the res.sons fo!i' .tbe e-Pe$• · 
'J ' 
ti on: -of th.is e-o .. cs.11.e d republie. 
independent · .a.ction oif the Manchurian p~ople was caused by the 
' ' 
fact th t Chang Hsueh-11 .ang' s ~litary dietatorsh1p had looked 
Qut for .itself and not the . welfare of the people. The people, 
' 
the · 1n1ster eentinued,. had sut.fered. •xtl'em$lJ under the . oor• 
rupt discipline in of£i~!&l. circles . Fu~tner, under the eld 
·regime factional st .rite .h,ad precluded eny unifie d or · tab .le 
govePnm.ent in Manehu:ria, _ and anti-fo~eign polieie had gre -atly 
disrupted diplo~atic rel&tione. 22 
@n .i.ta:reh 4 tbe pro-Jape.neee He?UT ~-:-fi ae inau~ .. 
rated preaident of' Maneh't1-kuo. 'lhe Ja,Paneae had teken great 
I ' I • ' • ~ 
pains to make the- entiPe affair lock like an ime end.ent move-
• I ~ 
r~nt, but few in the world we~e fooled by it end were unaware 
that th1 · new republie would be anything but a puppet state 
or Japan, 23 
-2~ Mr. Hsieh . -Ohieh-shih to the Secretary of State, 
arch 2 1 19. 32 • The. ,Forei~n ;Relations of the llnited Statee• The Far . East, 19J2, III, 97 . 
23 -akeuchi, op. 01 t., _P• 385 
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In light or these events, and encouraged by the posi-
tion or the tJnited States in the letter to Senator $(')rah, the 
League of Nations teek 1 ts most posi t1ve ste p iii the 4ispute 
up to that time . On Mat-eh 11 tbe A$.sembly, by a vote or 
f'ort7•tive to two, pase.d the f~llo~ing res<)lution! 24 u'!he 
Assembly • ., • de~lsres that it is ineumb-ent upon membetts of 
·the Le-agu o:r Nati one not to recognize any situ tton, tnet7 
or agreement hich mey be brought about by means contra:t'y tQ 
t h e Covenent of the Le-ague or Nations or the Pact of Paris . tt2> 
The p:u:a ose of this re · olution, whos.e two negative 
votee came .from J'apan at whom 1 t was directed and China who 
considered it too weak, w-as not le adjudieat& the me-rite of 
either side in the e~nfiict but wae to provide a stand&rd 
'Which would guide the members of th,e Assembl1 wh n the ~esult 
of the investigation was presented . The resolution furthe~ 
pr ·ovid d that a commt-ttee o'C n!noteen nation.a would study the 
results of' the Lytton Repol't when 1t wae received and aubmi t 
its recommendations to the Assemb l7. 26 
The March 11 Res olution w s ffl:4ely denounced in 
Japan. The J apanea-e argued that Manehu ri a was of a sp c1al 
ehe.ra-eter, end the prot1 sion of the I..eagae Coven.ant w&re not 
e.ppli~eble to 1 t. Th.ey ot>ntended that there was no juat1t1ca -
24 fhe Cemsul Gene:ral in Geneva. to the .·· e.cratary o.f 
State, · areb 11, 1932 .. ~h$ .Foretgn §elations J)f ;tne Unite<\ 
~~ates, The Far _ E~ t, 19,32, III. 73 
eS The Report of the League Ass,embly, op. cit., p . 24, 
26 StU1eon, op. cit .• , P• 187 
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tJ.on for the er,e$t1on of a committee to study the cas~ -. 2·7 
Thus, it was obvtou& th ·at any reeezmn•ndatlon the OommJ:ttee ot 
Nint,,te-en ~1ght 1utke, b•sed upon th• fopthcaming t7ttou :Report, 
w-euld mtet 'With c,e.ns;ae-rabl& oppoa1t10:n tl'Om th& 3apaneei•-. 
Al.taeugh tb• L-etgue- cUcl not 'Ilse the 10.ne· Powe-r Treaty 
as tbe bes1tt f"op ·its i\)ronoW':lcement;, a& d14 Se·c.tretirj StimaGJl.i 
r! .i 
ft, the lettel' to Senat .01' Sorah, 1 ts pQlie.7 end that 01' the. 
' ,. 
United States ••~e almost identical. Jf&lther had ope:nlt-
piteet e.n.1 bleme 1.lp~n lapan, bu.t the mor-411 p.-..es•11Jte :retult .in.g 
' from tuCh en 1mp11tit1~ti 1Jas pre•~nt .In both oe:se·a, neve:tthe• 
less. Fut-the.z-, there »ti,w wls a COll'UM)n agreetne.nt not te :reeog,. 
nize en.1 /apenese gain&; auoh a1 the tun, aba t,$ ot Man·chuk\io, 
it \he evideru,e : prove •d th.at thoi• ga1ne ••re •tt•Jne;ci tbreu,gh 
•ggreaeion and • violet1c>n or ex1at1ng · 1n:berriattonal t~••tiee. 
!he Vnf ted Sta,et1 •ae par~teulJt.X- -lY pie a·aed with the 
L•asue• s action and 1nd1.e-ated tb:ie : ple .a$Ure b7 thf followblg 
statement sent b-y the Un.ited State,1-t M1niate:r f.\t tern to tae 
Seeretaey Genttral e>A 'Mareh 12: 
I ·&Jn inatructe .4 b7 mJ gov$r•ent to e.xp:reee t~ 
you its gr•tift .c,ti(;n at tbe a~t!tn taken If ttie- Af• 
sembly ot the League or Hat:tona . My g$ve•mnent 1a 
especially graat1tted tb.e.t the · nltlons 0f' the wopld are 
united .on s policy not to l'eoogn1ae the valttllt7 · of :re--
eults .attained tn violation of th-e treatiea 111 -q11estion. 
this ia a distinct tontributton to i~t•~national law 
and o.fffll'8 a conetru.ct1ve basis £c,r peace ·-.25 
It now remtined tor the 1'1ad.ings of ,11$ Lytton O~s-
ston to ·be pre$en.ted to the League ·.• and · a final judgment 
17 fakeucht, SP• e1t.• • P• )79 
28 
·The Report of the League A.a$embly • op. c! _t.,. P• &.9 
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pas-sed. The agreement or the League and the United St~tes 
upon common policy re present ed a signirica nt step 1n inter-
national cooperatien. The fact remains. ho1rever, it had 
taken seven months to achieve this oomnon ground. In the 
meantine Japen had not been set baek and be.d grown increas• 
ingly hestile and independent . It we:s obvious now that she 
was ready to oppose any course of act:ton that might weaken 
her position or cause her to lose the gains she had alll'eady 
made . 
-O!lAPTER VI 
!'SE FINAL JUDGMENT 
The day following the adoption by the League or the 
resolution of Ma:rcn J.l; orn c11ds of the new state of 
Manch.ukuo demanded :recognition troni the outeide world , This 
was that puppet govermnent•s way of denouncing tbe Pee-olu-
tion, and it met with no tavorab1e reaction except in Japan . 
On March 18 the Japanese government •xpr,essed eatis.faction st 
the formation ot the new &tate an-d d·eclared th t recogni t1on 
by J'apanwould be forthcoin1.ng ea soon as the new regime waa 
established upon a firm foundatton. 1 
Surprisingly . th$ Japanese publie wae extremely dis -
appointe,d; at tbia policy of the cabinet. 'l'he average citizfn 
favored. immediate recognition, but the government teared the 
diplomatic consequ~ncea or $Uoh a move at that time, Even 
though the Seiyaka1 govemment was mudi more sympe:thetic to 
the military•s point or view than its precedessor has been, 
Japanese nationalism had become very e.ttre:me, e.nd the people 
had. begun to los ,e fa! th in the -entire parliamentary system . 
This type of gover-nment was being blamed for the country ts 
economic Elis.tress and the weak handling ef the ancburia.n and 
Shanghai questions. Also, it waa accused of corruption and 
1 Tak uehi, op. eit., P• 386 
(90) 
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association with big bus iness . Fanaticism was running ram• 
pent in Jflpsn iln !932, and many outstanding liberals felt the 
slash of the assaesin's blade. The most s1gnif'1cant instance 
oeeurred on ay lS when .a band of men dressed :tn military u.n1 ... 
form. attacked end killed Prime Minist er !nukai in ~is bome. 2 
/ 
Even bef'ore Inukai • s death, nationalistie feeling ha.El 
reaehed ~he point me-re 1 t was tvid.en t that the Japan♦te 
government mua.t defy the League and the United States in even 
stronger terins than 1 t had already done • · Consequently,. on 
Ap:ril 4 the Japanese Amb.$tsador warned th$ 11nited Stat♦s and 
the League that 1f the!i lattel' 'btdy passed -u.nravorable judg ... 
. mefi~ upon .Japan the~• would be no al te:r-nati ve • b'tit to w! thdraw 
that nation's delegates fi'om the Aasembly.3 Four days ·1ater, 
ln what wae apparently another act of de,f'ianee, an ani7 •&• 
c·reated in Manchukuo with .Japanese otf1eera engaged •s adv1• 
sore.4 
In lune the Japane•e Diet pa$t,8d a i'e•solu.tieti une.n1.-
mou.aly calling for the government to recogniee Mmehulmo . 
The resolution contended the. t such a 1nove would be the only 
means of ,tabil1z1ng the · a1tuat1on in Manch.1,1ria sn.d restoring 
~ranqu111ty to the Far East.5 Fe.nati.c1em was so at~ong at 
_ 
3 Metnorendum of the Sec reteJ'y of St .ate, . April !J., 1932 ... 
,he For ei n Relations of the United, States l; 
I, -7- 9 
4-'.rh.e Repo~t of the League Asse1nbl:y, op. oit., p . Sl 
$ "' - t ">88 
.,. k euch1; op. ci • , P• ;;; · 
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this point. that the government had no choice but to accede . 
On September 15, eleven d ys atter th$ Lytton Report had been 
completed and aent to Geneva, the Japanese ,gOVel"nmln'b o1.'f1• 
c1all1 recogmlzed Manehukuo. The United State " · ·not1'f'1e4 
of this action on that same d.ay . A· ,tatement eigne,d by both 
the Prime inia,teJ- ef Menchukuo, Chi~ghsiao•Hs11, and th ·e 
Jap anese Ambaesador to that government, Nobuyosh:l Muto, said:: 
"Ja psn has recognized tbe re.ct that aneb.,ukuo, in a~cordanee 
. with the tree will of it .s inhabitents, has o~gan!tied ani ee• 
tablished $ tselr into en independ .en.t territory . tt6 
J$pan ·t s reoognl.tion or ·Menchulcu.o et tbi& tine ea.used 
tremendous concern among the in.embers oi' the Le.ague and the 
Uni t ed Sta1tes. Leagu• Oeuneil Presid~t Ettmo.n l>e Valera of' 
Ireland was deeply disturbed that $Uch a move he:d come while 
the matter was still under League disel!le&ion . De Valera con -
tended that in view ot tn,e :faet that th-e League was about to 
reee1ve the report of the Lytton Conmieaion; the iapanest act 
was an 1r:reepons1ble one and wa s ealeulated only to prejudice 
the settlement of the dla ,pute. 7 !hue~ with the obvious knowl• 
edge that .Japau would opl)ose and p:robably defy any 11ti,ong ac-
tion · ga1.n$t her; the League of Nation .a prepared to view the 
Lytton Report and pass judgment upon the dieputant19 . 
6 ' ~ ' 
. T· xt or Protocal, September l;;• 19.32· • 'I'he Forei .gn 
Relations of the United States '!'he Far East . l 2, IV 
Wa.ehingtont The United States Government Printing Of.fi ee, 
1948), 2$3 
1 The Consul et Geneva to the Se .cretary- of State , 
September 24, 1932 - Ibid ., PP• 275. 76 
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The repo;rt t>f the Commission of mnquiry, eommonl7 
known as the Lytt .on Report , waa made public on October 2, 1932. 
Due to eeve:ral delays in getting the commissfon organi~ed and 
into "anchui-1 ·e, th• 1nve$tigat1on had ·not begun until six 
;months after the Mukden incident had . taken place. Over a 
year had passed ·•11'J,C8 ,oe beginning ' or' t.he CX''iErii ; 'before the ' 
report was published. Oex-tainly this detract from the ac-
e~acy of the .i-eport._ Furtherm ore , · 1 t dtals only b:riet'ly 
. . 
with the Shanghai que&tion which., despite th$ Jap-.ne ·se ~en-. 
tention, wai, a vital and integral part of the di~pute11 In 
f et, the report came- after what 1 t was int~nded ' to pJtev·ent 
became e fait aeoompli. Nevertheless, it represented ·the 
most comple ·te anal,-ais et the si tuat1 en available at that time. 
On Sundsf, October 2, at 1tOO A.M., a date and time 
speeifie4 b:y the Leagu , Dr. $. K,. litc>rnbe.ok, the heed of the 
State Bepartment' s Pa'!' $astern :Oivisfon, opene -d the packet 
o<>nta1n1~g e -eopy ct the Lytton Report. 8 The report is e,c-
tremel7 lengthJ, end for the purpose or swnmer7 in this study 
it may be 41v1ded lnto teur sections . These divimcions include-
th.e claim • of Japan that w-ere disregarded., the ultimate find• 
Uigs, 10111&: suggeet1ont, end a p~opoaed basis f4i>J' • aat1ef•e-. 
to~y eolution. 
The first cls .1m of Japan ,-.·eJoeted by the Comm1s$lon 
was th .at Oh1na was u unorganized state . lt wae dm1 tted 
tha -~ there were evils resulting from Ohina•s political and 
eocial unrest, but that count;ry was in the best .aha.pe it bad 
8 
·t1mson, OJih cit., p . 206 
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been since 1922. iind it ould be completely unjusti:fiehle to 
disqualify her ae a League membe~ a~ japan suggested.9 
' . 
The seeond d1 sregarded claim wee t.h.·at Ohina had no 
sovere1gnty ·over Manchuria. The Commission proclaimed ·that 
the great 1nmdgration of £armers from Chine and the aoknowledg• 
ments ·of legal treaties ·made Manchuria clearly Chinese.10 
Third , Jap 'at\t s argument th t sh,e was acting in self-
defense •a8 repudiat.ed. T:Q.e Commissian. however,., did not ex-
elude the pessibil1 ty that the of'ficer .s in charge may have 
felt ·they were - acting in that cape.cf t7 • 11 
·F1nal.ly 1 the lleged indepe-nden:t arul Alltonomoue etatus 
0£ ·1anobuku.o was not · aeeept d . !he Comm1.s.s1on oontended that 
the PJ"esenc -e of J.'apa,neee tr-oops end the ao.t1vl ties or e1vil 
and Illilitar1 off'ioial• were tteeponetble for the formation ot 
the new state, nd it could in ne> wa.7 be termed genuine ly 
spontaneous, lnde ·pendent movement.1 2 
'!hus repudiating Japan's poe1t1on on Manehuri4, the 
OQD1Tll1Ssion presen1;$d its ultimate findings. It p lace d 1'111 
responsibility upon Japan and etate4t 
1 thout declaration of war, a large -.rea of •.bat :t.a in-. 
disputably Chinese territory has been forcibly s&ir;ed 
and oeeupted · by the armed fore•• ot Japan end has. in 
conse que.nee o~ th.1$ opera.tion, betn separettd trom eno. 
declared indep•ndent or the rest of Ohina.lJ 
9 Report of Ille Com.mission or· Enquiry- ppo1nted bJ' 
the League of N$t1cns , Man.churis. (\Va:shingtoru The U»it ed 
States $ov.e~e -n, Printing Office, 19.32) p. 11 
10 Ib14 •• p. 21 
11 Ibid., 
- · 
P• 71 
12 tb14,, P• 91 
13 Ibid., p. 127 
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The report offered two besio auggeatJ.Gne. '?he tirat 
was that Pe·storation ot the statue quo would be no- solution. 
The second was that continuation ot the present Japanese eon-
trol in Manchuria would be equally unsat1e..faotor,-. It was 
as,erted that the . letter condition violated all eX1$ting inter• 
nat,1 onal obli,getion•, was oppoae .d. to the interests or China, 
-end it waa d.oub.tful that in tbe long ru.n 1 t woul4 e·ene the 
int•reeta of Japa~.14 
The report concluded by listing aeve~el principle$ 
upon which a aolution ought t.o be baae(ii. 'fhes.e principle .$ in-
cluded recognition of Chine.ta aovel'&ignty and Japanfs spee1•i 
int•reet 1n ManebuPi•• · conformity •1th all existing mu1t1• 
late ·ral peace troatiee. maintenance of general order al'ld fe• 
euri ty e.s•inat further- aggreaaion. provisi one tor the tettle.-
1.D.ent of tutur• d.1.aput•e• en.ti economic rapprochement instead 
of ecc0nomic •artare. 15 
fhe Lytton Report waa unenimoU:8 and included. no mi,-
no~ity opinions QJ.? i-eeommendat1ona. Its contc,nt was extr•mely 
plea$1ng to Seeiaetal'j Stim ,son. :tn Tbe_ Far E1aatern 0.l"is1at he 
praises the Oommission. tor not t'linching tre.m drawing con-clu ... 
s1ons on ultimate facte and tor lea?ing it to the l,eague to 
3udg.e mat the facts meant. The Secr4tary alao compliniente<l 
the Commitaion tor what he teJ!med lt& excellent ,uggest!.ona 
tor a aolutiob. 16 
14 lb1d., pp. 127-28 
lS Ibid-• . PP• 1.30••31 
16 St1m,on. op, cit., P• 206 
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Th~ Je.panese reaction to the report. nowever, wae a 
great . d~al different fr.om that of Stimson. The Japanese 
press was unanimous in condemning it. l'he sections that met 
part .icular crltie iam were the denial of Japan• · s claim of self.,. 
detenae., the imputation that anehukuo w•s ttMade 1n _Japan"• 
and tht r-etuse,l to paes any Judgment on 'the question . of the 
Chi».eee boJeott constituting a T1ol•t1on of international 
lew. 17 On this l&e.t point, however, • it should be noted that 
the eomm1as1on did recommend the eess•t1on of econ.omio war• 
fare-; even tbo~h 1 t did not mention the le .gall tf of the boy-
cott. 
fhe puppet government of Manob,ukuo else d.e.ru,.unced the 
report v1gorou.a.ly and ••id in a statement is ·aued to the 
I 
American -Comr1.1l General at Mu.kden: · · anohukuo oCtiei als &J'e 
ver-y incensed end eJtcited. We are simply ignoring th.e re• , 
port, Manell~o has nothing to do w1 th 1 t or the Le•gue. The 
report hits .eggJJavate4 the world si tuatlbn."18 MeanWhile, the 
JJpanee~ government waa cletel'mlned: to earr7 out 1 te policy , 
and 1 ts delegate t .o the League, Yo•Uke llatauoka, tn a state• 
ment made to that body on November 1.9, warnet that iu111 e.tt.em:pt 
to do en7thing dei-ogatory to the dignity of Japen would leave 
her ?J.O reeo,urae but to w1tbcu>a11' fron1 the Le·ag1,1e.19 
l ,7 ir·ak~uehi, op. 01~., P• 399 
18 Tne aonaul General. ~t au .den to the Minister in 
China, oc_ .tobe. ,- 61 19.32 - The Foreign 'elations of . the • Uni te4 Statea, _fh& _Far East• _1932, "IV. 2ijo ... 9~ . 
l(J 
'lhe Minitlter in $w1 tzerland to the Secretary of 
State, November 19, 1932 - .l.!.!J!•• P• 349 
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'!be handn1t1ng wae on the wall Y&len the League Ooun• 
cil e,pened 1 ts d:ebate on the contente: or the Lytton ·aeport on 
Novernb~t> 21 . A week later the Council v ot ·ed to pu~ the iseu• 
befo ,re the Assembly. Fell. _ewing the :pt'OVi.$1on• 0:f th• Mer_eh ll 
' Resolution. the assembly referrec.i the quest1 on to the conmi tt♦e 
of nine~••n nations on Deceml>er 9. lO The Q·emmi ttee ot fine teen 
fiiast atte.tapted to perform it•s duty by seeking e()neilia;tion. 
Beth 1m& U'ni ted States ·•nd Russi a wette invited to paPtieipste 
. ' 
in this effort. Sec~etfiJ>y Stimson was tteltt~tant to eoopei~ate 
1n this venture s1 nc.• he .feared a delay to attempt c.Qnctlia-
< 
tton might weaken tho £1nal League action . Neverthele, -s, he 
agreed to go along . with it in ord~n• n.o-t to hinder the c-ommi , ... 
tee's work. Stimson's apprehensiotls proved unnecessaryi ~s 
Japan rej eted li>oth the fJnite<l. $t41te& and Russia a$ pai--ties 
to conci;l1e:tion and d:ecl.ar• -d it flould accept n:o eol.utioJl Which 
denied the existence -ot Manehukuo . 21 
In compltt• del':lMce or the Oenunitt•e. or tlineteen's 
effo:rt -e t cen-etliation. Japan then renewed he:r milita .r7 
operations .. On Januaey _li 19.33 Japanese troop:e. attacked tbe 
e1ty of Shanhsinan , located just •outh of the Great wa·.~1 .·a~ 
its eastern e.~tr~mity, Shanhaikwe.n - was {l)f' e,xtr:&me . 1mpol'tence 
because 1 t wa-s the gateway to the Chinese prov1ncte ot JehoJ. 
whi .eb the Japanese eonslder ·e·d to be r-ightfu.lly pert of 
:Me:nchUkuo.- The. o.pe~~t1on prol'ed to be a ahat-t one, and 
Sham,.aikwan tell i'n two days . There se-med: to be little doubt 
(98) . 
now that n invasion of Jehol wss imminent. 22 
As soon as tbe news of the occupation of Shanhsikwan 
had been :neeived, Secretary Stimson held · another conference 
with the Japane ·se Amlnissad oP. 'l'he latter's explanatlon of the 
arr ir ·was not unexpected. He · stated · that the Ohlnese 1 h·ad fired 
iJhe .fil'st ahob •t · and Japan 1ra,s aeting · in self ... aetense .• · Again the 
assertion .w-ae mad• that Japen held no ter,r1 terial emb~tions~ 
Stime<>'n, obvto•sly anno7ed at this time.:wo:rn explanation, re• 
plied. that Japan had sa1d · the s sme thing · about M$nch;uria and wae 
now addisg the province ot Jeb.ol to her d.omain under the · same 
pretense •. The Am.bas-ae.d,orra- answer indicated jua.t how ' .fsr Japan's 
hostil1 t;y had developed. lie deelfilred that no Japanese ~abinet 
that compromised on the Manchurian situation could su.rv1ve, and . 
the incident must be considered closed. ZJ 
As expeet.ed.. the capture ot Shanhaikwan paved the we.7· 
for the inv ssion ot Jeho l. This new miii tary opei-ation; . ~0\lpled 
' ' 
w1 th Japan• s un;y1elding att1 tu.de• ¢onv1need the OQnlDi ttee ot 
ineteen that conei liation was impossible. The Com.Dd ttee then 
proce .eded to d:raft its ~epo:rt m.1ch waa presented to the Asee111bi.7 
on FebtiUar-y 21, 19)). \Yb.e Oomm.1ttee · of Nineteen aeeeptetf com• 
p'letely the findings of , the · Lytton Commission. It recogni~ed. 
that both Japan end China had legi tima,te grievances before Sep-
tem:ber 18, 1931 but declared that no reaponsibillty owld be 
placed upon Ohina f'o.r the events whie.b occui-red after that date. 
The repor-t further denied Jape.n • s argument of self-defense. 
22 The Report o:f the League Assembly. op. ct t., p. 59 
2.) . 
· Peaee and War, o:e, cit., pp. 5-6 
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recognized Chin .at s sovereignty _ c:>ver Manchurl , denied the 
'existence · ot anchukuo as anything but e puppet state or Japan . 
and Ul'ged. that n9 nation ·recognize it as an 1ndependenif st-ate . 
The hpo:rt · then coneludect· by t>ecommendlng th t -negotitttions 
be dp"hed 'between Japan and China 'tc se~k a solution ·baaed 
upon the stigg_eati ons and principles pre,ented by the Lytt~n 
Com.mission. including the r _ecommendation that Obin give up 
·the u,e et the ·c-omm.eroial boycott . 24 ·. ,. .· J'.:-
'Fhe report or ·the Committee 0£ ' .Ni~teen pia:cing fuil 
blame upon Japan was adopted by the League see.mbly on F~b:ru• 
ar1 24, with onl y one negative vote, Japa11, nd one bstent1on , 
Siam . The Japanese deleg .ate , ¥ats-uok.a, then deelued that 
Japan and tb.e other ll'l♦mbel's of the League enterte1tl$d differ -
ent views on how to aeb:!eve peao .e in the F'er East and t 'hat h1a 
government hl.ld reaehee the limit in i 'ti$ endeavor to cooperate 
with th~ League on the - Sino-Japanese question . Upon issuing 
this at .atement , titateuoka -and his staff walked out of the A-a• 
sembl.y.aS 
Se-c:retarr tim&on was at ·th:ts point taee4 wl th a pro• 
blem due to t.he fact the Republican admi-nisti- t1on h d been 
defeated in Novembor of 1932. Stimson was deteirm1ned to bring 
about ome conclusion to the affair but Wt!ls hand .le pped in 
that he . had no &ssuran.c ·e that the new De~oeratie adm1n1-et.ra- -
ti on would n.ot Peje .ct bis policy. ,rii:s. -oeneem p:rov&d to 'Ge 
24 Stimson, ~I!-- ci ~• • p. 2.27 
25 fhe Coneul at Geneva to the Secretary of state. 
February- 24, 1933 - ~ Foreign Relat1 ons of the Unfped . 
States, 'ghe, ,Far la.ll't , }.933, IlI · (Washington: 'The United 
St tes Oovei-nment Printing Office._ 1q49), 205 ... 208 
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short lived, boweve~ . At the suggestion of tb& newly elects~ 
presid-e~t. Franklin D. Roos-evelt, Stimson made a vts.lt to 
fiyde Park , At this me-et.:!ng Roose velt ta.ssured th-e eretapy 
that h1 ·S F.ar Eastern policy would be . follo~ed by , the new ad ... 
~ni1trat1on . 26 Thus, without any f'ear that the Demo¢rats 
might alter his policy , Stimson in.formed the Leagu · on Febru -
ary 2$ th .at the views of: the United States completely eQ1n-
c1de4 with the LeagUe's .findings. He also prolt11sed tbe.t the 
Ameztican government would ende vor to give full support to the 
League, while resening the right ·of independent judgment . 27 
Th~ United States had chosen t-o cast its lot wi-th the 
League in imposing what no: eonsti tuted. strong moral pree -
eure upon Japan fmd in ~e.t'ueing to reeogniee ManchUkuo, whfch 
was now adjudged to have been ereat~d in vio1ation of the 
multi•nation peace tr atie • But, de$p1te its implieSctic;,ne, 
this policy did not achieve its intended results . · On March · 
25 the State Department received word. that Japan would with -
draw ~rom the LeagQe or Na ions. Two days late~ a statement 
to thia effect was sent to G.eneva, and the w1 thdrawal was otfi • 
cia1. 28 
The policy of the United Stat~s and the League had re-
ceived nothing but defiance from Japan. Moral condem,nation 
.... \. .. ~ .... 
- - .... -
27 The l:'epor-t of the League Assembly,' o;p; cit,. P• .86 
28 Memorandum ef Under ecretery of tate Phillips , 
arch 25, 1933 ~ 'rpe Fore1~n Relations of t;he tf41ted States , 
The Far _ East , 1233. _IIi , 2 3 
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he.d re$ulted in that nation• s withdrawal from the League, and 
tl\e . policy of nc,,n ... reoogn.i tion of anchukuo did not force the 
Ja panese te dissolve that state. Further.more, in an act of 
complete hostility, the Japanese had continued theiz- aggres_-
aion into J'.ehol nd ha.d su ,ccess.fully conquered thet province 
by ·May o.f 193J.29 
In short, eve though she ha .. e.u eondemned · y wo:rJ.d 
publio opim,on, . J~ .P~n had S•lned ,e. victo ·17 1a its contlie 't 
with China. .American, poliey end that of' the League had ~ot 
been etteoti e i n pr eventing this victor7., Neither had this 
pol.ioy sueeeed$d in gaining r- s~ot !'or the inte:rnat.1Qnal' : 
peace t~eatiet' tlo~ had i tl brought .l!ln:Y sat1s.facti •on to , Chin •· 
Finally, the taste or v1otoey was pleasent to the Ja pan ese. 
They woula n present to the ..-orld their ttMonroe Doctrine• 
fer, As1a. They ould cont 1il: e to push forward in a .fanatic 
drive to dominate tb.e entire ar East at the risk of forcing 
tne Unit ed t te int'> eon.plete and t.otal war. 
29 
'lu.pper and c.neynol s, op. cit., P• 359 
CHAPTER VII 
OONCLUSl O 
The Sino-Japanese diapute durin g 1931 and 1932 was 
the firs t in the ~$ries of diplomatic crises leadin g t9. 
World War II . further., .it repl'e&ented the first major defeat 
for the League of Nc&tions . The 1nabil1 ty of the League to 
bring about a suc ,ces -sful solution to this quest-ion not only 
♦ncouraged Japan to further aggression but probably encou,rf:lged 
the totalitarian powers of Europe , as well. 
Two definite reeult -s of' American p~licy 1n this •£ .. 
.fail" can be een . F1:>!st,. it neither curbed J pant atn.b!tions 
nor provided a.ny satisfaction to Ghbu 1. :eeond• it contri -
buted to the weakening and collapse ot the League . 
lm:1 polic-y that doe not sueceed is open to contdd• 
erable cr1t1cism, It 1s much ·more diftieult to make t he de-
cision · that affect hta,tory , however; than it is to pass 
judgment on thoee deQi sions over twenty .. seven years later . 
Nevertheleee, there ••re two baele errors in the American 
policy 1n this contliet that need to b$ pointed out. 
'.i'be most fundamel'ltal mistake was to e.tay out c:f the 
dispute publicly fer ovet- two months in. order te give the 
e1vil1an el ement in the Ja pene · e government every poe ible 
chance to wor.k out a solution by itself . Idealistically , 
thi8 polioy wae a good one . It would have been better i'or 
(102) 
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all parties involved if the Japanese could have worked out 
the problem by themselves. Certainly the record of Baron 
Sh.idehara commanded eonfidenoe in his good intentions and will -
in gnees to seek a settlement satisfactory to ell parties. The 
dift'i cu1ty was that Shideh .ara and the liberal element had very 
little chance to overcome militaris m in Japan. American policy 
was actually a gamble that this greup would be able to gain 
control . It was a gamble w1 th little ho ,pe of success . 
The United St~tes 11.tayed out 'or the <lispute initially 
in orde~ to help Shidehara by not tanning the f!Lame& of n&• 
t-ionslism . As 1 t turned out, however, this policy had the 
rever ·s·~ 'eiieot. ·' Although Ameri<itm oppc,aitlon might hsYe con- . 
. : ' : ·' ' '·' 
tributecl' to Jap~ine'ae natl onelism. it probably would not have 
• '. 1"' 
enhtmeed this .feeling nea~ly as much ae did: the military sue-
oesses in Kanehuria . 
Secretary Stiinso 'n took 
,, 
chance which , lr 1t ha-d 
worked; would have conttituted a grest d1ploinatie victoi-y. 
Re did not , however, seem to take into oonside:rat1on the con • 
' . 
sequences that would l'esult if it tailed . Furthermore, there 
is no evidence to indicate that he ever made an ~tto~t to 
seek the advice of his envoys close to the situation as to 
the possib:!11 ty of the liberals regaining the dominant po.st• 
ti on in Japan tro m the ml 11 tsry . 
The m111taey• s adven tage of dire ·et access to the 
Emperor . the pr♦sence or General Minami 1n the cabinet, and 
the growing :feeling emong the Japeneae people that Jlanchuria 
represented the answer to their economic problems were 1nd1,.. 
cations that Japan would not return to Shidehara's polie7 of 
(104) 
c.oncil1ation. Secretary Stimson dtd not heed these indiee-
tions. . I~ste ,ad, he t .oll.owed e policy that led to failure · end 
gave Jap~ _tbe oppoPtunity to gain complete . domination ove.r 
Manchuria~ 
The ,second error 1n the Ameriee.n policy was the failure 
to . cooperate . fully .with the t,eague .. , · ifhere ean · be no doubt 
that part ct the 'bleme for the inef'fectiveness of tbe League ' 
1n handling this dispute belongs to the United States. 
Fro~ its beginning, the · IAtagu.e wa.s hampered by the 
tact t;ha t 1 t did not include the United States among 1 t.s J.D.em.:. 
· l>ei-s. The success of collective aet1on depend$ upon the co ... 
opera ti on _of all the great powers. The Leagu never he.cl any 
assurance that the United States, ct,r\a1nly one Gf the world' a 
great~at powers, would. provide that eeoperation. Even though 
the State .Department bad declared its willingness to support 
the League in .1 ts handling or the Manehurian fJJ;Uesti on, tbe 
member .s of that o,:ganiiatlon still re membered the. rejection · 
of Woodrow Wilson's d:reui by th enate end later · by the 
. . . 
American electQrate. With geed reason,. the.re was ccnsid•rable 
do~bt ea to the ext.ent to which the . Le.a.gue could eoun .t on the 
United States, 
"'Instead of showing i ta willin .gne$$ to cooperate at 
every po.ssi'ble opportunity, in order to build confidence in 
the intentions of the United States 8Dlong the League membera, 
the Sta~e - Department adopted a hesitant approacll. The with-
drawal of PPentias Gilbert f'rom. the L~~gue me~t1ngs Just prior 
to the passage of the . resolution of October 24, 1931 was a 
definite indication that the United States would baek the 
(105) 
League only .if it took action that n;et with complete knericen 
f ·vor _. · The ' several referrals to the -i,ign t of independent 
judgment~ · and th♦ later aloefness of Qharlea G. _. t>awes were . 
f'u~ther indications of this seme view. One reason the Leasue 
moved oaut:tously was to a.void · a rejection of .its _ action b1 
the United tates, and this caution contributed to its fail,.. 
ure in the af'tair and eventual collapse. It to.ck the Le ·ague . 
seventeen months to condemn · Japan. By that time the Japanese . 
had ae-h1$Ved their objective; also public opinio.n in their 
eeuntry would not have approved or · any attempt to relinquish 
what had already been gained. 
Th-e question now arises as to the possibility or a 
sueees-sfu.1 settlemeni of this d!spu.te, despite the two ba •si,e 
ettrors of the St te Department. Thia would have r~qu1red 
stronger action .ag inst J pe.n in early 19.33 thlttl moral pres-
sUl'e and non-recognition of Msnehukuo. 
One possibilitJ would have been the use of rmed 
Core&.. The Itorean incident of 1950 to 19$3 proved that a~e-d 
intervention on a limited scale can be ei'fe •ctive in halting 
eggre sion. The Korean eonfl1ct, however, . wes not the result 
cf the aggression ot e. m 3or power as •a-s the Mfllehu.rie.n inci-
dent. 'fhe use of armed force ag inst Japan wou.ld have me•nt 
a tull ecale war, and that was What e•eiryone was trying to 
prev~nt. Furthem,ore, lthough the ,rorld is ble to .secept . 
the idea of av-med intervention in the nineteen fifties., it 
was not re4dy tor such a course 0£ action in the thirties. 
Dr. s. K,. Hornbeck states that ttat no t!ine was there 1:n con -
(106) 
nection . with this incident serious suggestion or considera-
tion •ot poaiible ·:resort ••• by the United St'l\tes to armed 
force . wl 
The other alternative, then, would have be .en eco-
nomic aanct1ons. There ·1s no question that such a move would 
have 1 had ' a trem.endoue eti'eet upon Japan. That nation• s sh:ort -
age of raw m.ater-·tals had' made foreign trade vital to her wel• 
fare. To c·ut ott th1& trade would have been an -economic dis-
aster and would have neceasitated drastic action. It taced 
w1 th econoai1e sa-aet1ons .1apan would be confronted with two 
a.lt ·ernati'fea, to b · ck down er to tight. 
'lhe very nature of the Japanese people, who will go 
to great lengths to avoid hum111at1 on, indicates they would 
not have baeked down. Further e'fidence of this 1a found in 
a letter from the newly a:ppointed Ambassador to Japan, 
Joseph Grew, . to Secretary . timson fltitten in August of 1932. 
The Alnbaasado-r stated of the Japanes-e military machine: "It 
hes been built Tor war, t els prep&.Nd to'!!' wal' and . would wel-
come war. It has never yet been beaten end ' poaaeasea un-
llmi ted aelt cont1dence."2 
There wa.s s-ome support for sanctions tn the l1ni ted 
Statee. The American Boycott Assoeiat1on waa created to sup -
port su eh e •course • .3 In general, however, the 'fast majority 
1 Stanley K. Hornbeck, The United States and the Far 
East (Boston: The World Peace Foundation~ 1942) p. 30 1 • 
-
2 Peace and War, OEe cit., p. 6 
) Tupper and McReynelds , op. c~t., P• 336 
•." ' ( 1p7) . 
of' .Anieri~ ·an publ~c . ~I?in1on, particularly _th~ press , was vehe~ 
me,ntly ,opposed to ,sanetions.4 . Most of the lea ding congre1t• 
,., .. · . ' . ' . ' ' .. 
sional figures . we.re also _opposed to . them. , Sene.tor Borah -was 
. , ,! 1 j I• 
quoted ju.st )>e.(ore the p a~sa ee of the .teagu,' s Oeeember 10 • · , 
• I' ! '·, • • 
r~aolution e·1 ••7:1n:g; 
, I ' 
When the United .States employs its good offices in $very -· .. 
' re-a so.nab le way to brin,g bout · peace, l t has done all 1 t 
can do or should do. No treaty end .no . duty . devolving upon -
, peace ... lovlng ngtione requires or · permits the United States 
to go further.;, . . . · . 
tinally , both P:ves1dent Hoover and Secretary Stimson 
left no dQllbt that . rhey t~Q opposed . ftOO:nomic $&.neti on11 
strongly. St imson. openly stated that . he would nd.o nothing 
that in anyway wo,uld ¢ oimn1 t the United States to s~ch a 
c-ourse.n 6 
Thus, the use - ot economi~ ·$Jmeii one would not ~ave 
been supp~:rted by the United States, . Any poliey th _at met with · 
such ·strong opposition. both trom t}:le .le:e:d1ng tigur,ee !:n the 
. " . . . ' . 
administJte.tion and the publ ic, would. not have been possible . ·· 
Further, there is little doubt that such a pc;>l1ey, if it had 
been attempted, would have led the Vn1 te<l State a into a watt 
it de:finitely did not .want. 
It is \be conclusion o.f this . thesis, the .re-tore, that 
the mietak~s of the State Department, the initial delay and 
the failure to cooperate 1\llly w1 th the t _eague, were fatal. 
s Smith, op. cit., p. 180 
,_ 
6 
Stimson, op. ei t., P• 99 
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The only poes1ble peaceful solution to the problem depended 
~pon hunediate mo-ral pressu ,re, .• close cooperation between the 
United States and the League; and a definite e:ffort by the 
natione of the · world to assist Japan to overcome her eeonomle 
problems. '.t>espit _e the obvious guilt o'f Japan in this dispute, 
one must recognize t.hat he~ eeonomic situat1Qn-e . used by her 
overpopulation, shortage of raw mateirials. and un.favorable 
balance o:f trade-we.a partly responsible f'or her aggressive 
attitude. An7 peaceful set'tlement would have to be aympf1tb.et1c 
to this ~1 tu:ati on,. The Lytton Report suggested economic r . P-• 
prochement instead of economic wa:Pt• :'te. 7 Such & move W0\11d 
require more than a lifting of the Ghinese boycott whieh wae 
the purpose of the Oommi$s1on• s suggestion. It would require 
a conscie ·ntious e.ffert on the part ot all na.ti one to establish 
free trade with Japan and decreaae 1nun1gp,$t1on x>estrictions. 
It 1e encouraging to . note that as this theeifit 1e being written, 
in 19S8, the wealthier powers o.f the world are beginning to 
reeogniie the n,ed to combine economic a1d w1 th political 
agreetn•nts in solving diplomatie pr oblems. It is un.fortu~u~te 
that this awareness w&f! ·not ea promtnent in the nineteen 
thirties. 
fhe.fle i e absolutely no guarantee t.h.tt ttd.t appr~aeh 
to the question would have been sueeea tu.l. It is entirely 
-possible that economic 11ssistenee to Japan would net have 
curbed mil1ta:r11111 and extreme nationalism in that country. 
Also, there i ·s no aesuranee th.at moral pressure age.inst Japan, 
7 Stimson, o;e. oit., . p. 216 
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which failed !n early 1933 ., would have succeeded in the t ll 
of 1931. Finally, the-Pe 1s also no guarantee that th& League 
; ' of Nations would have b&en willing to take prom.pt ae,t1on even 
if 1 t .•ere assured . e.f rull Amet,iean cooperation . ·1ihe failure 
o.t the leading nations Gf' Europe to support the .Stims on f}'oc-
trine in J .anuar, of 1932 indioates that the League might have 
'been cautioue regardless or the attitude of the United tatee. 
'l'be people whe claim ,that war . i th Japan was inevi tab .le may 
One ean draw -conclusions on the mi •stakes maqe in 
history, but one oan only- speculate on wh t might have hap-
pened had those tnistakee net been iude. There is no assUl'.!.mee 
that the history of the nineteett tldl"ti,es and nine teen forties 
would have be ,e any di'tteX:-ent had immediate l'li.oral pP$$SUl'e 
been in-tli~ted upon Japan jointly by the U'nit$d States and 
the teague and h ad this eond mnation been eoupled with sin• 
cere et.fo~t to seek a solution to Japan, _ s eeon-om1c d1ff1eul ... 
ties. As a result 0r the evid$nee ]WQeented earlie~, however , 
it 1s the .fi,nn belief of this wr1te:P tb.at luch an approa ·eh · 
represe11it d the only possibility of a peaceful and pet-Iaanent 
settlement. 
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